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“i once a king and chief, now am the tree-barks thief,
ever twixt trunk and leaf, chasing the prey.”
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2

MICHAEL CASEY W. WOOLF is a Master of Divinity candidate and Ministry Fellow at Harvard
Divinity School. A candidate for ordination in the American Baptist Churches USA, Michael graduated
from the University of Tennessee - Knoxville in 2011 with a BA in Religious Studies. While he will be
completing his MDiv in May of 2014, his academic journey has only just begun, and he will begin
doctoral work (ThD) at Harvard Divinity School in the fall.

3

IMW Journal of Religious Studies Vol. 5:1

‡ “The Workingman of nazareTh”: represenTaTions of Jesus as
Laborer in The Masses (1911-1917), The poliTics of Jesus’ profession,
and Historical Jesus Debates ‡
In Matthew 13:55 and Mark 6:3, Jesus is identified as a son of a tekton and a tekton in his own
right respectively. While traditionally translated as “carpenter,” there is still significant scholarly
debate about how the term should actually be translated. This question has become even more
complicated by the discovery of Sepphoris, an urban center located less than four miles from Nazareth.
Instead of the humble carpenter consistently portrayed in religious iconography, some scholars have
begun to “locate Jesus more in the middle-class than in the lower middle-class…than in the lower class
of the period.”1 Others, like Géza Vêrmes come to another conclusion. According to Vermes, “in
Talmudic sayings the Aramaic noun denoting carpenter or craftsman (naggar) stands for a ‘scholar’ or
a ‘learned man,’” meaning that tekton might not even have anything to do with Jesus’ profession.2 And
still others maintain the traditional picture of the workingman of Nazareth, occupying the lowest
rungs of the social ladder: “‘artisan’ would be maybe our best translation. But in the pecking order of
peasant society, a peasant artisan is lower than a peasant farmer. It…means usually a peasant farmer
who had been pushed off the land and has to make his living…by laboring.” 3 With such a wide range
of interpretations of tekton, where are those searching for the real Jesus to turn?
Of course, this debate is neither new nor without political and theological significance. For
whether Jesus is a peasant, low-level artisan, or accomplished builder matters. While expressly religious
movements like the Social Gospel would naturally turn to Jesus as an emblem of their movement,

Holland Lee Hendrix, “Not a Humble Carpenter,” Jesus’ Many Faces—Jesus’ Social Class, PBS.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/religion/jesus/ socialclass.html.
2 Géza Vêrmes, Jesus the Jew: A Historian’s Reading of the Gospels (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1981), 22.
3John Dominic Crossan, “A Peasant Boy in a Peasant Village,” Jesus’ Many Faces—Jesus’ Social Class, PBS.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/religion/ jesus/socialclass.html.
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Jesus’ appeal was not limited to this realm.4 The Masses, a socialist magazine that ran from 1911-1917,
also joined the debate over the historical, theological and political meaning of tekton. In the magazine,
Jesus was conceived of as a poor carpenter or laborer—“the workingman of Nazareth”—in order to
serve its broader purpose, the promotion of socialism:
This paper belongs to the proletariat. It is the recording secretary of the Revolution in the
making. It is the notebook of working class history...It is NOT meant as a foray of unruly
truant children trying to sneak into the rich orchards of literature and art. It is an earnest and
living thing, a battle call, a shout of defiance, a blazing torch running madly through the night
to set afire the powder magazines of the world.5
This paper has two aims. First, it proposes that The Masses’ conscious depiction of Jesus as
laborer from 1911-1917 in order to marshal support for labor unions and critique the church illustrates
the theological and political stakes in how scholars describe Jesus’ profession. Secondly, this paper will
consider where The Masses’ portrayal of Jesus fits into contemporary historical Jesus scholarship,
paying special attention to how The Masses’ Jesus challenges the goals of contemporary scholarship
and suggests new criteria for evaluating what constitutes “good” historical Jesus scholarship.6

The Masses—Some Context
In 1911 Piet Vlag, “a bearded Dutchman more interested in cooperatives than in either art or
the social revolution,” founded The Masses, but the magazine’s real history began in late 1912 when

See Eugene Debs, “Jesus is the Supreme Leader”: “[Jesus] was born in a stable and cradled in a manger. This fact of itself, about
which there is no question, certifies conclusively the proletarian character of Jesus Christ,” who Debs sees as “the world’s
supreme revolutionary leader.” See also Guthrie’s “Jesus Christ,” where he sings: “Jesus Christ was a hardworking man and
brave.”
5 Arturo Giovanni, "What I Think of the Masses," The Masses, Vol. 8, No. 9 (July 1916). Emphasis his.
6 One might question whether The Masses’ Jesus and contemporary historical Jesus scholarship even belong in the same discussion,
arguing that one is a popular culture representation and the other represents objective scholarship. Such worries are warranted,
but, as this paper demonstrates at length, it is not that simple. Both representations are drawing on historical sources, positing a
narrative of the life of Jesus from those sources, and, as this paper will spend considerable time arguing, projecting their own
biases onto that “historical” work. The lines between popular culture and the historical Jesus are nowhere near as stark and clear
as scholars would like to believe, since postmodernism has destabilized the meaning and possibility of objectivity. In addition,
the work of David Burns can be helpful in outlining the ways that radical representations of Jesus in the early 20 th-century were
historical. See David Burns, The Life and Death of the Radical Historical Jesus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 12.
4
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Max Eastman became editor.7 He was notified of his election by a curt telegram message: “You are
elected editor of The Masses. No pay.”8 From 1911-1917 The Masses published socialist articles, poetry,
and art that, according to one contributor, “attack[ed] old systems, old morals, old prejudices…and set
up new ones in their place.”9 Never reaching a circulation of above 25,000, it was nevertheless
influential due to its ties with the early 20th century New York’s artist community.10 Perhaps Eastman
says it best when he describes The Masses as
A revolutionary and not a reform magazine…frank, impertinent, searching for the true causes;
a magazine directed against rigidity and dogma wherever it is found: printing what is too naked
or true for a money-making press: a magazine whose final policy is to do as it pleases and
conciliate nobody, not even its readers.11
Of course, such a magazine was bound to run into trouble—in fact that was part of the idea. A
socialist press not opposed by authorities is no socialist press at all. In 1913, The Masses published a
cartoon that depicted the Associated Press as poisoning the news at the source by withholding vital
information about a strike (Figure 1) and faced a libel suit. What finally caused the magazine to fail was
the its unceasing publication of articles and cartoons opposing World War I.12 Under the Espionage
Act of 1917, the US Post Office refused to deliver The Masses, and several members of the editorial
board were charged with conspiring to obstruct enlistment. While the editors beat the charges and
won an injunction against the Post Office, by that time The Masses was finished.13

The Masses’ Depictions of Jesus in Context: Some Predecessors
The following sections analyze several examples of how The Masses linked Jesus to early 20th
century, American class struggle. While the examination is not exhaustive—it does not, for example,
William L. O’Neill, Echoes of Revolt: The Masses, 1911-1917 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), 17.
Ibid.
9 Quoted in O’Neil, Echoes of Revolt, 7.
10 Keith M. Booker, Encyclopedia of Literature and Politics: H-R (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), 471.
11 Max Eastman, “Editorial Notice,” The Masses, Vol. 4, No. 10 ( July 1913): 2.
12 See Rebecca Zurier, Art for the Masses: A Radical Magazine and Its Graphics, 1911-1917 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1988), 58; see also Max Eastman, “War for War’s Sake,” The Masses, Vol 5, No. 12 (September 1914): 5.
13 Zurier, Art for the Masses, 61.
7
8
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give significant analysis of the Tannenbaum affair—it does comprise a somewhat representative
sample of The Masses’ engagement with Jesus as a historical, political, and literary figure.14 Before
delving into these representations, it is important to note that The Masses’ work was not anything
radically new. In fact, as scholars like Dan McKanan and David Burns have demonstrated in the past
several years, the radical Jesus imagined by The Masses built on the work of radicals like George
Lippard, a Philadelphia novelist and Universalist who, according to McKanan, “fleshed out a vision of
Jesus as a class-conscious laborer who proclaimed liberty to the captives and judgment to their
oppressors.”15 Lippard’s Jesus emerged on the scene in his 1847 work Washington and His Generals as
“the Carpenter of Nazareth resolved to redress the wrongs of the poor.”16 Lippard’s example prepared
the way for others to speak of Jesus as a class-conscious comrade who does battle with the
principalities and powers. In fact, McKanan argues, “prior to Lippard, few preachers described Jesus as
a workingman,” while the decades leading up to The Masses saw a flourishing of radical representations
of Jesus that built on Lippard’s ideas.17
Lippard’s influence can also be felt with several other radical reformers throughout the late 19 th
and early 20th century who built on his conceptualizations of Jesus as a class-conscious carpenter from
Galilee.18 For instance, in 1890, Thomas DeWitt Talmage extolled the virtues of a Christ who works
and suffers in the same way as modern workers: “You cannot tell Christ anything new about blistered
hands, or aching ankles, or bruised fingers, or stiff joints, or rising in the morning as tired as when you
lay down. While yet a boy He knew it all, He felt it all, He suffered it all.” 19 Not only has Christ
suffered on the cross for those he loved, he has also shared each and every one of the hardships that
The Tannenbaum affair refers to an incident in 1914 in which Frank Tannenbaum, an IWW leader, led a group of unemployed
workers to St. Alphonsus’ church in New York and occupied it. For an extensive analysis of the Tannenbaum affair and
theological/political responses to it, see Burns, The Life and Death of the Radical Historical Jesus, 98-103.
15 Dan McKanan, Prophetic Encounters: Religion and the American Radical Tradition (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2011), 113.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 See McKanan, Prophetic Encounters, 113-122.
19 Thomas DeWitt Talmage, From Manger to Throne (Philadelphia, Historical Publishing Company, 1890), 190.
14
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late 19th century industrial workers faced.

Likewise, in his 1895 piece “Christ,” Murphy O’hea claims that because Jesus was “a poor humble
carpenter…[a] lowly workingman of the bench, the man of hammer and nails,” the “cause of Labor is
holy” and “to defend labor is a virtue, [while] to deprive it of lawful rights [is] a sin, and a crime
against the mandates of the Creator himself.”20 As this paper will later show, The Masses will repeat
this formula of linking Jesus to a profession and using that connection to posit divine support for the
modern cause of labor.
While Talmage and O’hea represent two strategic deployments of Jesus the workingman, any
discussion of the radical historical Jesus would be incomplete without reference to Bouck White’s The
Call of the Carpenter. According to David Burns, the book, published in 1911, helped “the radical
historical Jesus bec[o]me a major force among socialists again.”21 Building on those who came before
him, “White ignored the objected boundaries erected by academic divines in order to create a didactic
piece of radical art that balanced and incorporated all of the diverse elements that had contributed to
the creation of the radical historical Jesus.”22 White’s Jesus was “a workingman that needeth not be
ashamed,” who “emerged from his wage-earner period…[with] an unalienable dignity, matured within
him by years of acknowledged mastership as a workman.”23 Molded by his craft, the Carpenter of
Nazareth “declared war on the capitalism of his day because capitalism was declaring war on him.”24
White’s book on Jesus was not only revolutionary; it was also extraordinarily popular. In 1913, Eugene
Debs reviewed it highly, calling it “the best book I have read during the last year” and “the greatest
book I have read since ‘Les Miserables.’”25 Debs was not alone in his review, and several other
prominent radicals, clergy, laypeople, and theologians also heaped their praise upon White’s work.
Murphy O’hea, “Christ,” The Railway Times, 1 November 1895.
Burns, The Life and Death of the Radical Historical Jesus, 82.
22 Ibid.
23 Bouck White, The Call of the Carpenter (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913), 38.
24 Ibid., 46.
25 Eugene Debs, “From Eugene V. Debs,” Life, Vol. 61. 1261.
20
21
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While White’s The Call of the Carpenter gives a firm foundation for thinking about The Masses’
depictions of Jesus, it is also instructive in another way. White used the new findings of biblical
criticism to develop a portrayal of Jesus that some of his critics disparaged as lacking rigor and
objectivity.26 Obviously, White disagreed, and David Burns argues that there was some credence to his
position since “what passed for authoritative declarations [in the early 20th century] were often little
more than personal opinions garnished with some scripture.”27 In essence, White claimed that his work
was “going to peer behind that imposing façade to the social life of the times—the myriad of slaves
toiling in the silver mines of the Athenians, in the vast brick fields of Rome, in the copper mines of
Sinai, in galleys on the Mediterranean.”28 By reading history from below, he insisted that there was
enough material to justify his claims about the radical historical Jesus.29 At the very least, White had as
much material on his side as more traditional scholars. For, as one reviewer of White’s The Call of the
Carpenter so eloquently put it:
We have no way of actually knowing what Jesus did or said, or even whom he was. The records
and sayings that have come down to us have passed through so many distortions and
corruptions at the hands of priests and vested interests that there is no scientific method of
demonstration or proof that can reveal his reality to us. Out of the fragments and distortions
we may put together what seems to us his original image and purpose.30
White certainly accomplished that feat, but the problem of his time—there was not enough material
for definitive statements about the life of Jesus, and scholars, despite their claims to objectivity, were
reading what they liked into Jesus’ story—did not go away. Scholars still find in Jesus what they want
to find, but they are rarely explicit about their perspective in the way that White is, a point that this
paper analyzes in depth in its final section.
Jesus Christ, Union Man: Art Young’s Images and Prose
Burns, The Life and Death of the Radical Historical Jesus, 91.
Ibid.
28 Quoted in Burns, The Life and Death of the Radical Historical Jesus, 87.
29 Ibid.
30 Quoted in Burns, The Life and Death of the Radical Historical Jesus, 11.
26
27
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For its special Christmas issue of 1913, The Masses printed a bold, provocative cover image
(Figure 2). In the piece illustrated by Art Young, one of The Masses’ more popular and prolific
illustrators, Jesus appears on a poster for an event and is described as “the workingman of Nazareth”
who “will speak at Brotherhood Hall” on “the rights of labor.”31 The references to Jesus’ profession are
clear-cut, leaving nothing to the imagination. While he might also be “King of Kings and Lord of
Lords” to many of The Masses’ readers, here Jesus is simply “the workingman of Nazareth,” who,
realizing his connection to laborers of every age, stands in solidarity with them and their unions. This
Jesus is no master-artisan with a host of underlings to command, like Hendrix might have us believe.
Nor is he necessarily Vermes’ wise teacher. He is simply Jesus—the workingman. In the end, this text
represents one the most overt examples of The Masses’ deployment of Jesus’ profession to drum up
support for labor unions and socialist politics, and also emphasizes the magazine’s commitment to
focusing on the humanity and fragility of Jesus, as opposed to his more divine representations in
churches.
While Christological concerns are important to Art Young’s image, Jesus’ actions are also
worth analyzing. By speaking at brotherhood hall on “the rights of labor” and styling himself “the
workingman of Nazareth,” Jesus emerges as a worker-leader of sorts. In fact, Young’s accompanying
article and later works explicitly claim that his Jesus was a “professional agitator,” a term which
requires some unpacking.32 Agitator was a term used by both radicals and their opponents alike. For
instance, the New York Call positively reviewed Bouck White’s Call of the Carpenter because it painted
him as a “true figure” and “agitator.”33 Likewise, early 20th century capitalists often labeled labor
activists as radical or professional agitators, a term that often carried with it the implication that
strikes began as the result of outside, even foreign, interference. For instance, in 1919 a steel mill

Art Young, “He Stirreth Up the People,” The Masses, Vol. 5 No. 3 (December 1913): Cover Image.
Art Young, Art Young—His Life and His Times (New York: Sheridan House, 1939), 294.
33 Burns, The Life and Death of the Radical Historical Jesus, 94.
31
32
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owner took out a full-page ad in The Pittsburg Chronicle to decry the “un-American teachings of radical
strike agitators” (See figure 5).34 The inference is clear: in portraying Jesus as an agitator, Young is
looping him in with organized labor and its methods. Young’s Jesus is pro-strike, pro-worker, and prounion. Jesus Christ the carpenter has become a union man.35
In addition to his cover image, Art Young also wrote an article called “One of Those Damned
Agitators” to accompany his 1913 image. In it, Young specifically calls Jesus “the Nazareth carpenter”
and “the great agitator of Palestine.”36 We have already seen how the language of agitation casts Jesus
in the same mold as labor activists of the early 20th century, but Young escalates and makes more
explicit his claim with this piece: “It is self-evident that had Jesus Christ, the great agitator of
Palestine, been born in the last half of the nineteenth century, he would to-day be one of the many
traveling speakers proclaiming the message of industrial democracy.”37 In his brief article, Young does
not trade in obtuse allusions or subtle hints; he is clear and explicit. For Young, it is “self-evident” that
Jesus, were he alive today, would be not only a great ally of the cause of industrial labor, but one of its
chief proponents and leaders. While he “lectur[ed] in the groves and byways of Palestine” in the first
century, today Jesus would proclaim a new gospel—the gospel of labor.38
And just like anyone who preaches an authentic gospel, persecution inevitably follows this
Jesus. Young posits, “[i]t is also self-evident that the authorities of these towns and cities would

“The Strike Has Failed,” The Pittsburg Chronicle, October 6, 1919.
It is also worth mentioning that Art Young’s image was reprinted in August 1921 in his journal Good Morning, which was
published from 1919-1921. The image is not located in a 1917 issue of The Masses as many sources report. This time Jesus
appears on a wanted poster, which offers a “reward for information leading” to his capture (Figure 3). The poster goes on to say
that he is wanted for “sedition, criminal anarchy, vagrancy and conspiring to overthrow the established government. The result
of Young’s second, reprinted poster is a Jesus who is linked inexorably to the cause of labor. He is a laborer himself, couched in
the same language (“professional agitator”) and persecuted in the same way (by a legal system that claims legitimacy, but has
proven itself to have none). Different socialist newspapers like The Southern Worker and The Daily Worker, as well as some
religious publications reprinted the poster. In fact, it was so popular that it continues to be displayed by leftists even today, often
with updated language. For example, Occupy London protesters updated the wanted poster to include references to Bradley
Manning and Julian Assange, while casting Barack Obama and Queen Elizabeth II as Christ’s enemies (Figure 4).
36 Art Young, “One of Those Damned Agitators,” The Masses, Vol. 5, No. 3 (December 1913): 3.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
34
35
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consider him “Dangerous” or “Inciter to Riot,” “Accessory before the fact,” and an “Obstructer of
traffic.”39 Importantly, these are some of the same charges levied against strikers by authorities. For
instance, IWW leaders Joseph J. Ettor and Arturo Giovanetti were charged with being an accessory
before the fact of the murder of a striker during the 1912 Bread and Roses strike, even though they
were miles away from the event and later acquitted.40 Likewise, the more violent Pullman Strike of
1894 resulted in accusations of “arson, murder, burglary, intimidation, assault, riot, and inciting to
riot.”41 Finally, in language similar to that used by Young, strikers in the Seattle General Strike of
1919 were called “ringleaders of anarchy.”42 In charging this Jesus who preaches the gospel of
“industrial democracy” with the same crimes that IWW strikers and activists were frequently charged
with, Young is making an explicit link between Jesus and socialist labor actions.43 This has the dual
effect of sacralizing the IWW’s organized strike and bringing Jesus to the fore in one of the biggest
political issues of the day. The IWW strikers receive halos, while Jesus grows an unruly beard. This
Jesus preaches the same gospel as organizations like the IWW and, perhaps more importantly, suffers
the same consequences as those organizations. He has become one of them, but there is one difference:
“a sober second thought would tell them that the working class of this twentieth century might not
stand for [the Jesus’ arrest and prosecution].”44
Jesus Christ, Union Man: Selected Poems
Finally, having analyzed two of Art Young’s posters and one instance of his prose, we can turn
our attention to some of The Masses’ poetry. Two poems in The Masses explicitly depict Jesus as a
common laborer and labor advocate. The first poem, “A Ballad,” by a poet known simply as “Williams,”

Ibid.
Gerda Lerner, “The” Female Experience: An American Documentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 421.
41 Lindsey Almont, The Pullman Strike: The Story of a Unique Experiment and of a Great Labor Upheaval (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1943), 218.
42Jeremy Brecher, Strike! (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1997), 128.
43 Young, “One of Those Damned Agitators,” The Masses, (December 1913).
44 Ibid.
39
40

Michael Casey W. Woolf: “The Working Man of Nazareth”

12

focuses not on Jesus but on Joseph. “Williams” makes the case that Joseph, the “carpenter stiff ” and
Nazarene, is “the biggest man in creation.”45 What makes Joseph so admirable is that, even though he
knows that the child that Mary will deliver is not his, he is committed to raising it: “God knows what
he told th’ neighbors/ But he knew it warn’t no Ghost/…An’ after the years had run,/ Folks tho’t no
more o’ th’ gossip/ But called ‘im the Carpenter’s Son.”46 Here, in emphasizing not just Jesus’ humanity
but his position within society—illegitimate child, born to a poor family in a manger, and, most
importantly for this paper, a carpenter’s son—“Williams” depicts Jesus as an ally to those at the bottom
of the social pyramid. Within the context of The Masses, being an ally takes a very specific form—the
support of unionization and the strike. In essence, “Williams” poem makes it clear that Jesus is not a
boss; he is the illegitimate-but-nonetheless-claimed son of Joseph, the “carpenter stiff.”47 He is one of
the countless laborers who realizes that, in the words of Ralph Chaplin’s “Solidarity Forever,” “we can
bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old. For the union makes us strong.”48
The second of these poems, “Comrade Jesus” by Sarah Cleghorn, is much more direct in
presenting Jesus as a laborer and union man.49 Cleghorn’s poem again depicts Jesus as a professional
agitator who is part of “mass-meetings in Palestine.”50 Here Jesus stands up for the rights of the poor
and destitute, identifying strongly with those parts of society that the poem’s Pharisees and Sadducees
detest:
We knew whose side was spoken for
When Comrade Jesus had the floor.
Where sore they toil and hard they lie,
Among the great unwashed, dwell I:
“Williams,” “A Ballad,” The Masses, Vol. 8, No. 3 (January 1916): 13.
Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ralph Chaplin, “Solidarity Forever,” Songs of the Workers To Fan the Flames of Discontent: The Little Red Songbook, IWW Booklet,
2005, 4-5.
49 The language of “comrade” can also be seen in John Richard Brown, Jesus the Joyous Comrade, (New York: Association Press,
1911).
50 Sarah Cleghorn, “Comrade Jesus,” The Masses, Vol. 5, No. 7 (April 1914): 14.
45
46
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The tramp, the convict I am he;
Cold-shoulder him, cold-shoulder me.51

Cleghorn’s depiction of Jesus as a tramp demands some unpacking. Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively for present day readers, The Masses’ leaders would have associated the tramp or hobo with
unions. For instance, the IWW had hobos and tramps as members. As a result, one can say that
Cleghorn is portraying Jesus as a laborer of sorts.52 At the very least Jesus of Nazareth is eligible for
union membership. Also worthy of note is the anti-Semitism in Cleghorn’s “Comrade Jesus.” Here
Cleghorn makes Pharisees gross caricatures of greedy, oppressive capitalists, uniting nearly two
thousand years of Christian anti-Judaism with anti-Semitism and socialist politics.
The message from the abovementioned lines is clear—it is not enough to be a laborer; one must
be actively fighting for change through action, specifically the type of action embodied by the labor
movement. Jesus is not only associated with tramps and convicts, but he advocates for them in “massmeetings.” In effect, the poem makes Jesus an ally of that oft-attacked tactic of early 20th century
labor—the strike. But the poem’s message goes further, and in its final lines makes clear that it is not
only action that is endorsed but action within the proper community—the Industrial Workers of the
World or “Wobblies”:
Ah, let no local him refuse
Comrade Jesus hath paid his dues
Whatever other be debarred,
Comrade Jesus has his red card. 53
In the early 20th century (and today), all IWW members possessed a red card where they would
mark their payment of dues through a stamp (Figure 6). When they had done so, they were welcome
at all local chapters of the IWW. If Art Young made Jesus a union man, Sarah Cleghorn took it one
Ibid.
See: Todd DePastino, Citizen Hobo: How a Century of Homelessness Shaped America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003);
Frank Higbie, Indispensible Outcasts: Hobo Workers and Community in the American Midwest (Champagne, IL: University of
Illinois Press, 2003).
53 Sarah Cleghorn, “Comrade Jesus,” The Masses, (April 1914).
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step further. Jesus has been transformed from a meek and mild carpenter to a class-conscious comrade
who refused to be broken by capitalist powers. In a somewhat startling image, the cosmic ruler of the
universe is a card-carrying member of the Industrial Workers of the World, and perhaps more
importantly, all of his dues are paid. For Sarah Cleghorn and The Masses, Jesus is a Wobbly.
Whether in prose or art, the four examples discussed above accomplish similar goals. They
downplay or fail to mention any divine qualities of Jesus, emphasize his humanity, highlight his lowly
origins or status as laborer, and either implicitly or explicitly cast him as a union member or
sympathizer. As such, these four examples represent an explicit deployment of Jesus’ status as tekton to
make a point, arguing that trade unionism and Christianity are neither incompatible nor competing
interests; they have the same goals. For if Christ were around today, The Masses posits that not only
would he be a member of the carpenter’s union, he would be the union’s president. To the titles “prince
of peace,” “king of kings and lord of lords,” and “light of the world,” The Masses would add one
more—“Jesus Christ, tekton and union man.”
Wait, Where Did That Come From?: Anti-Semitism in Sarah Leghorn’s “Comrade Jesus”
While the above discussion of Sarah Cleghorn’s “Comrade Jesus” has principally focused on her
portrayal of Jesus, an in-depth analysis of her depiction of Jews is also warranted. In “Comrade Jesus,”
a strict dichotomy is set up between the Pharisees, with Caiaphas at their head, and Jesus. Since “We
knew whose side was spoken for/ When Comrade Jesus had the floor,” readers can also assume what
side was spoken for when Jesus’ enemies, the Pharisees, had the floor.54 For Cleghorn, the Pharisees
speak for the rich, hegemonic powers of 1st century Palestine and the capitalists of the early 20th
century. Unfortunately, the poem goes further. Cleghorn’s Pharisees are petty slanderers who become
indignant when Jesus threatens their power. Indeed, Jews do not appear at this “mass-meeting in
Palestine” until Jesus condemns the rich, but then they become livid and kill him, masking their love of
54
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power with holy talk:
By Dives’ door, with thoughtful eye,
He did tomorrow prophesy:
“The Kingdom’s gate is low and small:
The rich can scarce wedge through at all.”
“A dangerous man,” said Caiaphas,
“An ignorant demagogue alas.
Friend of low women, it is he
Slanders the Upright Pharisee.”
For law and order, it was plain,
For holy Church, he must be slain.”55

But Cleghorn’s Jesus refuses to soil his hands by violence, instead choosing to be free from the
“childishness” of the Pharisees.56 In Cleghorn’s eyes, the Pharisees are nothing short of childish
brutes, like the contemporary capitalists she abhorred. But from where does this portrayal come—is it
merely the same sort of Christian anti-Judaism that one finds in patristic sources or Martin Luther, or
is it something different? In my estimation, Cleghorn draws on the undeniably long history of
Christian anti-Judaism in her “Comrade Jesus” by making use of the trope of self-righteous Pharisees
more concerned with law and order than truth, but she also utilizes a particular brand of economic
anti-Semitism common in 19th and 20th century socialist thought.
Of course, economic anti-Semitism has been around far longer than Karl Marx, but it finds a
particularly intense and cogent manifestation in his On the Jewish Question, which uses economic antiSemitism to argue somewhat counter-intuitively for the political emancipation of Jews in Germany. In
On the Jewish Question, Marx contends that the essentialized Jew’s true God is money, not YHWH:
“What is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly religion of the

55
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Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly God? Money.”57 Marx then follows this statement with the
extremely anti-Semitic contention that “the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind
from Judaism.”58
Unfortunately, Marx’s legacy of anti-Semitism would be carried forward in the 20th century by
leftists who projected the perceived problems of capitalist society onto Jews, a convenient and
unfortunately popular target. Although writing specifically about German Marxists, Olaf
Kistenmacher puts it best when he explains, “over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, the
traditional anti-Jewish stigmatization was transformed from the ‘rich Jews’ to the modern conspiracy
theory, in which ‘Jews’ not only were regarded as rich and powerful, but also personified the entire
capitalist society.”59 When contributors to The Masses like Sarah Cleghorn presented Jews as greedy
capitalists intent on destroying a virtuous, socialist Jesus, they were not inventing the wheel anew;
they were participating in a long legacy of Marxist critique and Christian anti-Judaism.
While The Masses’ representation of Jesus represents a convergence of Christian anti-Judaism
and Marxist anti-Semitism, it also sheds some light on one of the problems of radical historical Jesus
scholarship. Often, in an effort to portray Jesus as a radical, scholars construct an image of an
oppressive Judaism to use as a foil for Jesus’ liberative message. Amy-Jill Levine talks at length about
this problem in her book The Misunderstood Jew. For Levine, the problem has never been using biblical
texts to depict Jesus in a liberative manner, since “the biblical material has always been (and should
continue to be) used to promote a more just society.”60 The problem is that this approach can easily
descend into anti-Semitic portrayals of “the Jews:”
If Jesus preaches good news to the poor, so the common impression goes, “the Jews” must be
Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question,” Ed. Andy Blunden, et al., 2010, 19.
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/On%20The%20Jewish%20Question.pdf
58 Ibid.
59 Olaf Kistenmacher, “From ‘Judas’ to ‘Jewish Captial’: Antisemitic Forms of Thought in German Communist Party (KPD) in the
Weimar Republic, 1918-1933,” Engage Journal, Issue 2, May 2006.
60 Amy-Jill Levine, The Misunderstood Jew: The Church and the Scandal of the Jewish Jesus (New York: :HarperCollins, 2006), 9.
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preaching good news to the rich. If Jesus welcomes sinners, “the Jews” must have pushed them
away. If Jesus speaks to or heals women, “the Jews” must have set up a patriarchal society that
makes the Taliban look progressive.61

And so Levine demonstrates that The Masses’ problematic representations of Judaism are not the sole
purview of early 20th century Marxists—they unfortunately continue to be a major issue in
progressive historical Jesus scholarship to this day. Good, liberative intentions can only take one so far.
Over a century after The Masses first began publishing, the situation has not improved nearly as much
as one would like. But the question remains: can one take The Masses’ image of a union-Jesus seriously?
This is precisely the discussion I would like to turn to in the following pages.
But is There a Place for The Masses’ Jesus at the Inn?: Historical Jesus Debates
One thing is certain: The Masses is not interested in obscuring its political aims. Due to the
magazine’s directness, The Masses’ deployment of Jesus’ profession constitutes a unique insight into the
political and theological stakes inherent in Jesus’ profession. For whether Jesus is a lowly carpenter,
wandering hobo, or skilled artisan matters, and this fact does not escape The Masses’ contributors. The
magazine constructs from Gospel sources a radical, socialist, Wobbly-Jesus precisely because their
constituency and their social project demand it. Jesus appears in The Masses as a Wobbly because that is
the Christological form that the magazine imagines for him. Of course, he was not a member of the
Industrial Workers of the World in first century Palestine—that would be impossible. Rather, that is
the form he would take in the present moment—the ideal tekton is, of course, a union man. A wealthy,
skilled artisan is unimaginable in The Masses’ consciousness because such a Jesus would naturally ally
himself, not with workers struggling to gain respect and rights, but with the bosses.
But how does one handle this explicit projection of The Masses’ desires and social location onto
Jesus? Is it simply an intriguing historical artifact from the early 20th century, or does it have
something to add to current historical Jesus scholarship? How one chooses to answer this question
61
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gets to the very heart of the historical Jesus project’s goals. For if one believes that the purpose of
historical Jesus scholarship is to objectively portray Jesus without projecting anything onto him, then
The Masses’ Jesus is at best ludicrous, and at worst a grotesque twisting of Jesus’ message for blatantly
political aims.
In placing an emphasis on objectivity, one is joined by the likes of Albert Schweitzer, whose
biting critique of 19th century Jesus scholarship rings true still today: “But it was not only each epoch
that found its reflection in Jesus; each individual created Him in accordance with his own character.
There is no historical task which so reveals a man’s true self as the writing of a Life of Jesus.”62 More
recently, John Dominic Crossan articulated a similar view, contending “it is impossible to avoid the
suspicion that historical Jesus research is a very safe place…to do autobiography and call it
biography.”63 Furthermore, in one of the most bizarre dialogues ever recorded in modern scholarship,
Crossan contends “the historical Jesus is speaking to me” and that he, predictably, approves of
Crossan’s Jesus: A Revolutionary Biography:
“I’ve read your book, Dominic, and it’s quite good. So now you’re ready to live by my vision and
join me in my program?”
“I don’t think I have the courage, Jesus, but I did describe it quite well, didn’t I, and the method
was especially good wasn’t it?”
“Thank you, Dominic, for not falsifying the message to suit your own incapacity. That at least is
something.64
For Crossan, it is possible to avoid “falsifying the message” of Jesus and to accurately depict the life of
a man who lived two thousand years ago without bias, and, even more importantly, any depictions of
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Jesus that depart from his own are biased.65 Here, there is no room for The Masses’ Wobbly-Jesus at the
inn.
Thankfully, this is not the only way to conceive of the task of historical Jesus scholarship.
From the start, this latest quest for the historical Jesus has posited multiple answers to Jesus question,
“who do you say that I am.” For Crossan, “that stunning diversity is an academic embarrassment.”66 But
for others, most notably Kwok Pui-lan, the opposite is true; the multiplicity of opinions about Jesus is a
great asset, not a liability, and certainly not an embarrassment. For Pui-lan, “there is no original or
privileged understanding of Christ…that can be claimed as pure and foundational, not subject to the
limitations of culture and history. It is a futile exercise to search for the ‘real’ or historical Jesus.” 67 For
all Crossan and the Jesus seminar’s impressive talk, there is no pristine, untouched Jesus to get back to;
what we have is interpretation, not fact. Quoting George Soares-Prabhu, a biblical scholar from India,
Pui-lan asserts that the multiplicity of Jesus’ representations is only natural, since “every community
evolves its own understanding of Jesus responding to its own cry for life.”68 As a result, she suggests
using “can you guess how many different names Jesus has in the world?” as a starting point for
thinking about Jesus.69 Where the Jesus Seminar used colored balls to indicate statements about Jesus
they thought were true, Pui-lan advocates a different kind of approach, one that brings “decentered,
diasporic, Third world, Jewish, black, gay and lesbian, immigrant, [and] brown-skinned women’s
perspectives” into the conversation.70 For Pui-lan, The Masses’ Wobbly-Jesus takes its place between
Corn Mother and Shakti-Jesus as an authentic depiction, and the quest for a positivistic or “real”
historical Jesus is, in effect, done away with.
Ibid.
Crossan, The Historical Jesus, xxviii-xxix: “the plurality is enough to underline the problem…it seems we have as many pictures as
we have exegetes.”
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68 Ibid., 172.
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If one adopts Pui-lan’s model, as I am advocating, then the quest for the historical Jesus is over.
Here Pui-lan and Michael Bird, two scholars who disagree on many accounts, come together; they both
agree on the theologization of the quest for the historical Jesus. For, as Michael Bird puts it, “the
historical Jesus is not the ‘real’ Jesus. The search is for the reconstruction of Jesus…the picture of
Jesus that emerges from the application of historical tools.”71 If scholars are no longer chasing after a
“real” Jesus, then the type of historical Jesus research that seems most appropriate is overtly
theological: “historical Jesus study is a form of narrative theology whereby the Jesus story is explored
in relation to the Christian belief-mosaic that it generated.”72 After all, whether scholars explicitly
admit it or not, “the history of Jesus emits far-reaching theological significance,” and it seems both
unwise and deceptive to ignore how historical Jesus scholarship impacts and is shaped by theology.73 In
essence, I am calling for historical Jesus scholarship to be honest about both the type of theological
and social impact it is trying to create, and the ways that it continues to be shaped by scholars’ social
location and theological presuppositions. This would require figures like Crossan to drop the pretense
of objectivity and embrace that his Jesus is a peasant-cynic precisely because this is the Jesus that
speaks to his theological and social location and the type of world, both theologically and socially, he is
attempting to create. The Masses’ Jesus represents just the type of scholarship that I am advocating for;
it is honest about the type of Jesus it is depicting and why it is doing so.
But where does that leave those interested in Jesus the person—are they to simply accept every
model for the historical Jesus that gets proposed on the grounds that all are equally valid? Bird puts
the perceived problem with pluriformity like this: “texts can be used to sculpt a masterpiece or create a
monster, and there is no longer any critical basis to call one a beauty and the other an abomination
since such readings are self-authenticating and there is no authorial-textual magistrate to render

Michel Bird, “The Peril of Modernizing Jesus and the Crisis of Not Contemporizing Christ,” EQ 78.4, (2006): 306.
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judgment.”74 To put it bluntly, this objection is overplayed. While embracing multiplicity may leave
scholars without the false security of objectivity, I do think that there are two criteria one can use
discern which models for Jesus are at least relatively better than others. The first is historical
feasibility—how likely is it that this model represents historical reality? The second is functional
significance—what does this model for Jesus do? What communities does it impact, and how? More
specifically, I draw on Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza’s Jesus and the Politics of Interpretation when
formulating this second criterion. In this work, Fiorenza reformulates Patricia Hill Collins’ framework
for analyzing social theory into three epistemological questions that “must be asked” when considering
historical Jesus scholarship.75 One of these questions serves as the second criterion’s driving force:
“does this social theory equip people to resist oppression, and is it functional as a tool of social
transformation?”76
For instance, while it might be low-hanging fruit, one can use these two criteria to reject the
Aryan Jesus proposed by Nazi theologians. The Aryan Jesus fails on both counts: it is not historically
plausible that Jesus was the descendant of a Viking clan, and, more importantly, the Aryan Jesus is the
theological weapon of anti-Semitism in its most overt form—its goal is violence and destruction. But
it is more interesting to apply these two criteria to another claim about the historical Jesus that centers
on his profession and social class, but comes to a different conclusion than The Masses—American
prosperity gospel theology. Prosperity gospel theologians claim that Jesus was “constantly in a state of
wealth,” and they simultaneously posit what that means for their followers: “God wants his [sic]
followers to be rich.”77 Surely one can say that this model for Jesus is neither historically plausible
(Jesus certainly does not seem to be wealthy), nor does it have the social impact that one wishes to see
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in the world. It merely reinforces capitalist hegemony and subjugates the poor by telling them that
Jesus could have never been one of them, since “the rich will never follow the poor.”78 By contrast, The
Masses’ Jesus fairs well on both counts. The magazine consistently portrays Jesus as a “workingman,”
tramp, or carpenter, which is in line with the historical resources at our disposal, and uses Jesus’
profession to “equip people to resist oppression” and transform the world.79 Where it begins to get in
trouble, however, is in recapitulating anti-Semitic images of Pharisees and Sadducees. While on the
whole The Masses does a good job of making their Jesus a “tool of social transformation,” here they
come up short.
In the end, The Masses’ use of Jesus’ profession to rally support for their socialist politics is an
honest endeavor—The Masses is uninterested in claiming objectivity. As such, The Masses’ depiction of
Jesus as “workingman” and Wobbly demonstrates in a vivid, exciting way the political and theological
impact of historical Jesus scholarship. But The Masses’ portrayal of Jesus can also serve as both a
challenge to contemporary Jesus scholarship and a touchstone for creating new standards for what
constitutes “good” historical Jesus scholarship. Drawing on the work of Pui-lan and Bird, I have
suggested that there is no “real” Jesus to be found in scholarship. Instead, scholars have only models
for Jesus, some of which are better than others. It is my contention that one should take The Masses’
portrayal of Jesus as seriously as one might take Dominic Crossan, Luke Timothy Johnson, or Holland
Lee Hendrix’s representations of Jesus and his profession. In fact, one must do so, for The Masses’ Jesus
constitutes the epitome of “good” historical Jesus scholarship—it is liberative, honest, and historically
grounded. But taking The Masses’ Jesus seriously also means turning a critical eye towards it, and
while there is much good in The Masses’ portrayal of Jesus, in some of the texts there is a convergence
of socialist politics, anti-Semitism, radical historical Jesus scholarship, and Christian anti-Judaism.
This cannot be swept under the proverbial rug, and, if one applies the criterion of functional
78
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significance to this specific instance, The Masses would certainly fail. But, on the whole, The Masses’
Jesus does not fail that criterion—it uses historically grounded scholarship about Jesus to equip the
proletariat to do battle with Mammon. Moreover, as this paper has discussed, one would be hard
pressed to find liberative historical Jesus scholarship that is perfect. The point here is that those
interested in the historical Jesus should take the liberation of The Masses’ Jesus, while also critiquing
its faults. If we are willing to do so, then we might find that, almost a century later, the Wobbly-Jesus
leads us forward.
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‡ Symbolism in Asian Statues of the Buddha ‡
Art may have either a literal or a symbolic function; it may depict real people and places, or
deified persons who are represented symbolically. Iconography—the correlation between
representational characteristics and otherworldly concepts—is like a code. When the semiotics of the
art is studied, deeper meaning can be excavated. Mircea Eliade notes with insight, “The iconography
of the Buddha…has been transported from his human condition”1 and into his spiritual hypostasis.
In Asian statues of the Buddha, each part of the statue is highly symbolic and contains physical
articulations of religious ideals. In the creation of such statues, the artist is cognizant of the deeply
metaphorical nuances she has created. These sculptures are done with the intention that devotees will
enhance their understanding of enlightenment through the viewing and internalizing the meaning of
the Buddha.
In surveying the diverse statues of the Buddha from across Asia, certain repetitious themes
appear, such as the ways in which the head and parts of the head, the hands in their mudras, the legs of
the Buddha—be it seated or standing—and the accouterments that surround the Enlightened One are
created to serve a heuristic function for the devotee. Since iconography is a universal language, the
artistic depictions of statues of the Buddha translate across nation and dialect. The great consistency
allows meaning to be centralized to the unchangeable location of the statue itself, instead of
contextualized to the country of origin or display. Once these aspects of Buddhist art are understood,
additional insight into the account of Siddhartha and the way of the Buddha can be more readily
assimilated into Buddhist practice.
Envisioning the Absolute: the Head and Face
The head of the Enlightened One contains many aspects that are symbolic of the nature and
actions of the Buddha. In such statues, although the head contains ordinary human aspects such as the
1
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hair, eyes, and ears, the deeper meaning bursts forth from statues to reveal the narrative of Siddhartha
Gautama as superficial perceptions give way to a rich spiritual tradition. Within the artistic medium of
the statue, the hair, bindu, and ears all function on a realistic and a stylistic-representational level.
Beginning visually at the pinnacle of a Buddha statue, one will observe the hair. Although this natural
part of the body is unassuming, the hair in statues of the Buddha reveals the stage of the quest for
enlightenment: long hair is related to the imperial man Siddhartha, and short hair corresponds to the
renunciation of wealth and decadence. But there are varieties within these two hairstyles as well. The
urna and the curls of the Buddha also have meaning in iconography.
The story of the princely Siddhartha begins in the palace, with a young man sheltered from the
tribulations of the world. As a standard aesthetic, long hair, or ushnisha, would be the style the
adolescent prince would have worn fastened on top of his head. This topknot, which is etymologically
related to the word “turban,” recalls the embryonic stages of Buddha’s quest for enlightenment
whereby he was still trapped in a royal and unenlightened lifestyle [see Figure 1].2 The hair that was a
part of the Buddha for the duration of his life was characteristic of decadence and a painless existence.
Yet the long princely hair is not the only way one might recognize the stately Buddha.
Perhaps foreshadowing the imminent enlightenment, the urna—one single curl—on the
forehead is used in conjunction with the hair atop the head to add the aspect of super-intelligence.3
The urna represents wisdom to the devotee and confirms that the Four Nobel Truths and the Eight
Fold Path could only be realized by one who exudes a supernatural wisdom. With the mahaabhiniskramana, or great departure from his father’s palace, the ushnisha and urna disappear, just as
decadence is left behind and asceticism calls to the young prince.
Enthralled by the ascetic life and dismayed by the suffering of the world beyond his regal gates,
Siddhartha flees from the security of the palace and determines to follow a life of deprivation in
2
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aspirations of achieving moksha or liberation from samsara. The first step in this new direction was to
chop off his handsome, long locks of hair.4 The shearing of this symbol of power was a drastic
divorce from a life of delicacy to an existence of difficult deprivation and meditation.
Legend states that after the Buddha decided to lop off his mane with a sword, the hair curled
tightly around his head at two fingers breadth in length; it stayed that way permanently, along with his
equal length beard. It is said he never had to trim his hair or beard again.5 Although most statues of
the Buddha do not picture him with a beard, the short, curly hair is readily identifiable [see Figure 2]
and the peppercorn hairstyle is always indicative of the Buddha after his departure. Whereas the long
hair on top of the Buddha’s head depicts the moments prior to his sojourn into enlightenment, his
short hair represents his foray into asceticism. In addition to hair, features of the faces of the Buddha
in Asian statues also uncover symbolism.
As the story of the quest for enlightenment unfurls, devotees learn that neither the life of
luxury nor the mendicant lifestyle would engender enlightenment. Rather, the Middle Way was the
true path to Nirvana. The meditation that was necessary for this realization manifest in the statues of
the Buddha through accessories of the Buddha’s face. The bindu on his forehead and his elongated ears
both have distinct roles in the representational qualities of the Buddha.
A teardrop shaped bump in the middle of the forehead is one of the most recognizable features
of Buddhist statues [see Figures 2 and 4]. The bindu is placed where the third eye is, in the center of
the forehead, symmetrically above the actual eyes. When the bindu is positioned on the Buddha, it
demonstrates the Absolute being imagined by the dot or as a vanishing point. The meditative
visualizing of the Absolute—which maintains and sustains the material world—cannot actually be
depicted because it is beyond time and space. The Absolute must only be contemplated and its
invisibility considered. To add a bindu to the face of the Buddha is to imply intense deliberation on the
4
5
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unfathomable.6 This utilization of a small artistic addition to sculptures of the Buddha compounds the
symbolism in a drastic way by adding spiritual depth.
Another striking formation of sculptures of the Buddha is the unnaturally long and droopy
ears [see Figure 1]. The ears, which were stretched, represent the nobility of the Buddha before he
avowed to find the passageway to enlightenment. Gautama’s princely circumstance were conducive to
affluence; with this wealth came jewels, which, when worn in the ears as earrings, stretched the lobes
of the ears out and down because of their weight.7 The utterly physical, yet enormously symbolic ears
on the Buddha statues—recognizable by their protracted, hanging lobes—reveals a deeply human
truth: people may reinvent themselves into compassionate beings, yet they remain tied to their past.
Even as the path to Nirvana is undertaken, some small visage of the former life may remain but does
not have to define Being.
Depicting the Buddha with protracted earlobes signifies the hopes of transformation. The
Buddha was a prince with great prosperity who lived a life of opulence, without enlightenment. Once
he had forsaken his former life, including the accessories he would have been accustomed to in and on
his body, and began meditating unto enlightenment, his corporeal existence still bore the marks of a
life lived in darkness—the ears that had been stretched by the jewels.
Contained within the sculpted head of the Buddha are many indications of the ontological
morphology of one man who achieved the highest state. Through the various stages of his hair and
the additions to his face and ears, a disciple could take solace in an objective achieved and conjecture an
appropriate approach to following the Buddha. In the same way, the arms, hands, and fingers of the
Buddhist statues are important for elucidation of the Buddha’s life and taught principles. Signs of the
body and arms are semiotic: when a certain motion is made, a corresponding emotion or idea is evoked.
Gestures of Compassion: the Hands
6
7
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Because the Buddha remained on earth as a Bodhisattva, he is limited to a human body. Yet
because of his enlightened status, he is also beyond mere human posing. In Asian statues of the
Buddha, the hands signify a higher spiritual meaning. Among the various ways to depict the hands of
the Buddha, the use of mudras contextualizes the Buddha and his teachings. “The enormously
formalized and cultivated language of gesture, in which the worshipper might read not only the special
powers and attributes of the god, but also the particular ecstatic mood that the deity personified” is the
role of mudras in statues of the Buddha.8 These mudras are a development of the meditative Buddha in
his quest for enlightenment and the responsibility that came with his amassed insight. While there are
variations on the hand mudras, six basic types dominate artistic depictions of the Buddha.
The Dhyana-mudra depicts concentration in yogic meditation, where the hands are positioned
palms up, with one hand inside the other, so the fingers overlap and the thumbs are just touching. The
hands are resting on the lap. This arrangement signifies not only the way the Siddhartha was situated
when he was meditating for many days, it is also a position still used by yogis and those meditating.
The thumbs circulate energy as a closed system and the practitioner is able to focus on non-attachment
with their hands in a resting pose.
Once this meditation has achieved enlightenment, the Bhuumisparsha-mudra is used, with the
right hand hanging over the right knee, touching the ground [see Figures 1 and 2]. The hand touches
the ground in attestation of the attainment of Nirvana. After the long meditation, Gautama beckoned
the earth as a witness to his awesome achievement by touching the firmament with his hand
(Bhuumisparsha-mudra) from the position of meditation he was seated in.9 When this gesture is
recreated in iconography, it confirms the accomplishment of the Buddha and possibility for those
seeking the release of samsara.

8
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Upon achieving enlightenment, the Buddha may then teach the Dharma, or eternal law. The
Dharmachakra-mudra shows the Buddha turning the wheel of the Dharma. His fingers imitate a circle
and his forefinger and thumb connect in an enclosure on both hands. These two wheels touch at the
intersection of all four nails on the four fingers emulating the infinite line that has no beginning and
no end: the circle. The hands are raised to chest height, with one hand pointing up while the other,
with palm up, is parallel to the ground. In this manner, it appears as if a wheel is turning, giving the
illusion of continuity. The noble teacher shares his insight with his followers and beckons them to
come and learn; this gesture has come to stand for the first preaching at Sarnath.10
After the laws are taught, the Buddha stands and invites devotees to learn the Four Noble
Truths. A very important gesture for the intellectualization of Buddha’s quest is the Vitarka-mudra,
which has usually the left hand palm towards the audience and fingers pointing skyward, while the
other palm is facing the audience, but the fingers are pointing down [see Figure 3]. This mudra is
symbolic of explaining and expressing Dharma. The left hand facing up is a symbol of peace—an open
palm that bears no ill intent. The right hand facing down is a motion of bestowal—the Dharma can be
given to those who seek it. In an almost mirror image positioning, the Abhaya-mudra, the right hand is
held with the palm towards the audience and the fingers towards the sky while the fingers on the left
hand point towards the ground [see Figure 4]. To followers of Buddha, this mudra equates to
protection, reassurance, and serenity. It is the most common of all the gestures in iconography of the
Buddha.11
From here, the statues of the Buddha may be placed with both hands emphasizing blessing or both
hands emphasizing endowment. If the former is the object of the artist’s desires, than both hands will
be fashioned facing up, palms towards the audience [see Figure 5]. Other religions, such as
Christianity, also depict saints or other religious figures in the same gesture of benediction. When the
10
11
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intent is of the latter sort and giving is the main emphasis, the Vara-mudra will be shown with both
hands facing downward and the palms towards the followers.12 This position is representative of
compassionate allowance of favors and fulfillment of vows.
All six of the most commonly observed mudras have their own connotations. The range of
meanings in Buddhist statues would be seriously diminished if even one mudra were not utilized.
Although the function of the mudra originated in the Hindu tradition and they are apparent in panAsian features of Buddhist art, the symbolism of the meditative (Dhyana) and teaching (Dharmachakra)
mudras are distinctly Buddhist, demonstrating to the onlooker of the statue an essential aspect of the
instructions of the Buddha.13
Meditation: the Body, Legs, and Feet
Moving visually from the head to the hands, the devotee, now inspired by such concepts as the
Absolute and divine compassion, seeks to understand the orator Buddha. Both the seated and the
standing Buddha represent correlative aspects of the mission of the One who remained on earth so
others may achieve enlightenment. The seated Gautama is deep in contemplation; thus he has either
begun to meditate, or has just achieved enlightenment. The actually phase of his meditation must be
determined by other indications of the statues, such as mudras. Once enlightenment has been achieved,
the Buddha arises and travels to preach the Four Nobel Truths to fellow human creatures, indicating a
sojourn of kindness. Both the sitting and the standing Buddha have much to disclose to the iconodule.
In the most common statues of the Buddha, he is seen in a seated position—perhaps because
seeking enlightenment through meditation was the fulcrum for the Buddhist tradition, and the
achievement of Nirvana was attained while seated. When the Buddha is placed in the meditative lotus
position, his legs are crossed and both soles of his feet are upturned and revealed. The contemplative
posture is an ancient yogic position [see Figures 1 and 2], symbolic of the perfectly trained body and
12
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breath which enables the contortion of oneself into an uncommon position. In the lotus pose, the back
is straight, but not rigid, and the legs are closely locked. The knees and buttocks form a tight
triangular base that is much sturdier than if one crossed their legs in the Western fashion. In the lotus
position, the body has three contact points; in the Western position, only the buttocks and locked
ankles are in contact with the ground. Thus the ancient lotus pose has both physiological and religious
components.
Contemplation is the conduit through which the Buddha achieved Nirvana, and it is the
position that is still used for meditation. The Buddha, as an example to all, is shown meditating as a
guide for the followers. It is interesting to note that although the yogic meditation position is highly
symbolic of the achievement of enlightenment, sometimes the statue was carved in this manner for
the sake of convenience. For example, in Ceylon statues of the Buddha in the lotus position from the
early Singhalese period were often depicted sitting because the granulites did not allow for much fine
detailing or spaces that would support a standing Buddha.14 Nevertheless, the seated Buddha’s
significance is not diminished, for it is this position that the Buddha preaches his first sermon.
One will notice that although the legs are piled atop each other, the feet are visible and turned
up towards the sky. This too, has meaning. In these vestiges, much can be deduced about the
circumstances of the Buddha by looking at the artist’s rendition of his feet. The Buddha’s feet, both by
statue or by a hollow depression in the ground, are important to the Buddhist tradition. In statues
where the Buddha is seated in the lotus position, though the feet are exposed, they are not a means of
shame even though feet are vehicles of the body and suffer much wear. Indeed, the feet of the Buddha
are holy—once he untangles his body and places his feet on the ground, Siddhartha is prepared to
begin his preaching.
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Traveling through countries and liberating the people from hindering notions of attachment
caused Buddhism to flourish. In fact, most nations that revere the Enlightened One make claim to the
impression of the Buddha’s feet, either by a depression or imprint in stone or by aggrandized
sculptures of his feet.15 These markings are kept in shrines and placed next to relics. The synecdoche
of the feet and impression that the Buddha has walked and preached in a certain spot is as much a
reminder of the goal of enlightenment as an actual statue. In one other depiction of note, when
Gautama is standing the bottoms of his feet are concealed [see Figure 4], yet in one slight variation
there is the walking Buddha, where one foot is raised from the ground, implying motion. 16 Both the
standing and walking Buddha are symbolic to the observer and conjure strong feelings of regard to
the devotee.
Chronologically, as the Buddha moves from the long period of seated meditation to the
realization of Nirvana, he then takes his place as a Bodhisattva who aids others in the journey to
enlightenment. This is done through teaching, traveling, and preaching. It is no surprise, then, that
there are many perpendicular statues of the Buddha. Beyond this functional use of immortalizing the
migratory Buddha is the deeper reading of lifestyle that may be gleaned from the statues.
One of the most striking differences of the standing Buddha is that the figure and shape of his
body are revealed because he is elongated rather than seated. In statues, the form of the Enlightened
One is always made with fluidity and is identifiable by “the smoothly round attenuation of body and
limbs and in the way that the drapery entirely reveals the form beneath.”17 The drapery, of course, is
simple the robe he would have been wearing on his passage to illumination. In typical ascetic style, the
right shoulder is often exposed, showing Buddha’s commitment to realize enlightenment through
forgoing worldly gratification. The minimal raiment that the standing Buddha displays is
15
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representational of a simple life without the encumbrance of fashion to dictate social status or the
need of protection from the elements—the fierce sun, bitter snow, or whipping wind. Also, as clothing
may conceal flaws of the body, the well-trained Buddha has nothing to hide as he has been subjugating
his body to his will.
When the Buddha is standing, his torso—the center of his body—is often revealed. If the robe
only covers his lower extremities, the chest and waist are revealed and the itinerant is depicted as lean
and athletic. The wiry frame would be typical of one who, giving up comforts like excess food, found
himself delicately formed and lithe. Often the body will be shown tilted from the hips, implying
action.18 The energetic motion of the Buddha with the torso moving on the axis of the hips may
depict the motion of preaching—also a lively activity.
The position of the body—seated or standing—along with the feet of the Buddha have great
representational meaning, especially when viewed in conjunction with the head, face, and hands of
Siddhartha. Yet symbolism in Asian statues of the Buddha is not limited to his physical body. Other
creatures, flora, and ornamentation accompany the Buddha. These also reveal important stories and
lessons from the life of Gautama.
The Perfect Buddha Mind: Accouterments
The Buddha taken as a whole is sublime, yet the particular aspects of the Buddhist statues such
as head, arms, and legs are likewise illustrative to the iconographer. Garnishes surrounding the
Buddha—like the flora, fauna, and accessories incorporated into sculptures of the Buddha such as the
snake, lotus, halo, and Bodhi tree—are widely recognizable and highly figurative in Buddhist statues.
These additions to Buddhist statues reveal a further dimension to the story of the prince Siddhartha,
his journey to enlightenment, and the path to Nirvana. Without the addition of the aforementioned
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accoutrements to the statues of the Buddha, the story of Gautama would not be as full and the
symbolism not as rich.
Otherworldly apparitions may appear in various forms, but when serpents are depicted in
Buddhist art they represent the life-force completing the cycle of life, i.e. birth, death, and rebirth. A
snake sheds its skin in a type of death, yet remains the same snake. When they slither out of their old
body, they emerge reborn, a new being, yet with a vestige of the old. When the serpent image is
harmonized with the Buddha, the snake emerges as the protector, guardian, and defender as well as the
being of renovation. The crux of Buddhism lies in the enlightenment. Had the Buddha not attained
this perfection, there would be no Buddhism; had supernatural forces not been watching over Gautama,
the path to illumination may never have been found.
Legend tells that prior to the Buddha’s enlightenment, he went through a series of meditations,
each a week long and under a different tree. While under the third tree, he came upon the abode of the
serpent king Muchalinda [see Figure 6]. The benevolent snake-ruler perceived that once Gautama had
entered a state of blissful ecstasy, a squall approached and the Enlightened One was in peril. In
response, the protective serpent king coiled himself around the Buddha seven times. Upon the
cessation of the storm, Muchalinda unwound himself and became a youth.19 Had it not been for the
refuge of the snake, the Enlightened One may have been injured or fallen ill; therefore Muchalinda
became immortalized in Buddhist art as a protector. In addition to the snake, the tree appears as an
aspect of the natural world which has emerged in Asian statues of the Buddha. Like the snake, the tree
is more than what it appears to be.
Of all the accessories the Buddha is depicted with, perhaps the Bodhi tree is the most
significant. The Bodhi tree has a special place in the corpus of Buddhist imagery, as it is the location
where the Buddha was sitting upon achieving his enlightenment, and it represents both his mental
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state and his enlightened mind.20 It should be noted that the ordinary tree would have no mystical
representation alone, but when placed within the context of Buddhist art, it becomes an indicator of
the divine place in which the Buddha had his moment that spawned enlightenment.
Yet the mere appearance of the Bodhi tree is not suggestive of the Buddha in a postenlightened state if the other symbolic aspects of the statues do not also point to the attainment of
Nirvana. That is, the mudras are the definitive declaration on the station to the path of enlightenment
of the Buddha—either before, during, or following his illumination. Whereas a Bodhi tree with a long
haired Buddha in the meditative posture denotes the quest for illumination, the tree with the Buddha
beckoning the earth as witness conveys the moment of enlightenment, and the Bodhi with the Buddha
in the preaching gesture (Vitarka-mudra) assures the viewers that the Dharma is elucidated. The tree
therefore is secondary in terms of symbolism to the construction of the person of the Buddha.
Various aspects of nature are important to Buddhism, and the depictions of trees as well as
flowers reinforce the connection to nature, ahimsa [non-violence], and the story of the Buddha. The
Padma, or lotus flowers, are one of the more familiar aspects of Buddhist sculptures depicting
Gautama [see Figures 1 and 2]. The lotus, which is tied to the Hindu pantheon of iconography, is
deeply meaningful as
the Enlightened One [is] proclaimed Vishnu’s ninth incarnation. His throne is with its lotus
base or backdrop or canopy parallels the Preserver’s iconography, as do the likeness of the
Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara –Padmapani, the “All Observing Lord with the Lotus in his hand.”21
Additional insights into the water flower’s symbolism are dependent on how the lotus is sculpted or
viewed. The lotus represents a complete manifestation; the true essence of all. At the center of the
flower is the nucleus of the universe. From an aerial view, the lotus is a circle which looks like the
mandala. The construction of a temporary sand mandala is, of course, a ritual practiced by monks and
20
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devotees to engage in the exercise of non-attachment. This too has meaning, yet the padma takes on
additional symbolism when examined from its botanical function.
Expanding elegantly, the lotus is a picturesque flower that has emerged from murky fluid. This
corresponds to the victory of the Buddha achieving enlightenment despite the world of attachment
and suffering. When the Buddha is seated upon a lotus, it is his throne; and like an incarnation of the
god Vishnu, only a magnificent representation will suffice.22 The splendid lotus has meanings as varied
as its petals. Sometimes embossed to enhance their majesty, they reveal what is hidden; but often these
excavated mysteries are difficult to understand.23 Yet the One seated upon the lotus throne has
comprehended such inexplicable concepts such as eternity or the universe.
The padma reaches to the center of the intellectual nature of Buddhism. A cerebral affiliation
with the pure mind of the Buddha is key. Siddhartha Gautama was not a man stagnant in belief. From
his time in the palace he sought the truth, and after leaving his comfort he turned to asceticism. This
lifestyle of the monk was steeped in meditation and concentration. Only the vast dedication of
introspection could manifest in the attainment of Nirvana.
The illumination of enlightenment as a spiritual event cannot be created literally, so often the
images of the Buddha are accompanied by a light or halo surrounding the head [see Figure 2]. The
halo is mystical and powerful, and the beam can also be called the Buddha light. It is emblematic of the
awesome wisdom that is so pervasive; it radiates from above Siddhartha’s mind and into his
surroundings. The attainment of such enlightenment cannot be contained in his psyche alone, but
bursts forth into the world. The spectrum of artistic interpretations of this beam has been as abstract
as a ray of light, or as concrete as flames. The symbol of spiritual knowledge can be intensified when
it surrounds the body as well as the head.24 These themes appear in other religious art; holy flames
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indicative of super knowledge would later surround the prophet Mohamed in Islam. And like the
intention of Islamic iconographers, when the ray light is present upon Buddha an aspect of
beatification is added to the image of the figure.

The artist’s translation of the rich traditions of the Buddha into sculptures and statues are as
diverse as the artists themselves. Yet comprehension of the symbolism is contingent on the perception
and intellectual dexterity of the devotee. To one who can read the statue that has been written [the
literal meaning of “iconography”], great depth and detail is gleaned. To those who merely see a piece
of art, only superficial conclusions can be made. Iconography, therefore, is not just a practice for the
artistic elite, but a ritual of devotees in all stages of spiritual journeying. It is “not only the conception
of the figure in terms of mass and simplified planes, but the manner in which the forms appear to
emerge from the plain background of the rock” that make an inanimate object become worthy of
devotion and study.25
At first glance, the image of the Buddha may seem one-dimensional: just a man seated and possibly
adorned or accompanied by some other symbol like a flower or tree. But in fact the many permutations
of the Buddha, from his head, hands, legs, feet, and additional ornaments, are very specific in
significance and are not fashioned haphazardly. Studying the representations of hairstyle or hand
mudras speak to both the literate and the illiterate. The separate understanding of each characteristic
of the Buddha exponentially enhances the understanding that comes from deciphering the symbolism
of Buddhist sculptures. The attraction of Buddhist statues is the mystery that can be uncovered with
insight into the culture and stories of Buddhism. Influential scholar Mircea Eliade explains:
In Buddhism the various hypostases of the Buddha have its own special color, gesture and
symbol. And not only that, but in each ritual…the symbols are varied. As a result, iconography
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knows an infinite number of nuances, each indicating a certain step, a state well established on
the spiritual ladder of ascent.26
The significance of the Buddha statue for the perfect Buddha mind is singular: that there is one
essence, or sattva, which is the Buddhahood or enlightenment. To gaze upon a statue of Buddha,
observe the representational details of the head, arms, and legs is to look at that essence, understand
the cycle of samsara, and diligently pursue Nirvana.
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‡ On the Development of Spinoza’s Account of Human Religion ‡
In his philosophical and political writings, Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) develops an account
of human religion, which represents a unique theoretical orientation in the early modern period.1 This
position is implicit in many of Spinoza’s philosophical arguments in the Treatise on the Emendation of
the Intellect, the Short Treatise, and Ethics.2 However, it is most carefully developed in his Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus (hereafter TTP).3 What makes Spinoza’s position unique is the fact that he rejects a
traditional conception of religion on naturalistic grounds, while refusing to dismiss all religion as an
entirely anthropological phenomenon. This might, at first, seem like an illegitimate attempt to avoid
the full implications of a naturalistic world view; however, Spinoza has sophisticated arguments, from
within his philosophical perspective, which defend both aspects of his view. In this manner, Spinoza’s
work reveals the possibility of a theoretical orientation that was unimaginable to many of his
contemporaries.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to become clear on what is meant by Spinoza’s
naturalism. In contemporary philosophy, the term “naturalism” is generally used to refer to a range of
positions which hold that philosophical theories must respect the view of the world revealed by the
natural sciences and use the discoveries of the natural sciences as a guide. In religious studies,
naturalism is generally used to characterize positions that explain religious beliefs and practices
entirely within the domain of the natural and social sciences. Each of these positions share significant
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affinities with Spinoza’s view, but the form of naturalism found in Spinoza’s philosophical system is
more closely tied to rationalism.
Spinoza’s naturalism is, perhaps, best grasped by considering the argument Spinoza provides
for the impossibility of miracles in chapter six of the TTP. Spinoza begins by supposing, for the sake
of argument, that miracles occur. He points out that a miracle, by definition, “must necessarily
interrupt Nature’s order which otherwise we would conceive as fixed and immutable by God’s
decrees.”4 He then argues that this opposition to God’s establishment of natural order would “cast
doubt on everything, and would lead to atheism.”5 This argument reveals the fact that Spinoza views
the impossibility of miracles, and, by implication, naturalism as a logical consequence of the existence
of God. Spinoza’s conception of God is based entirely on rational investigation and is devoid of
theistic elements. Thus, Spinoza’s belief in God, properly understood, is nothing more than a belief in
a natural world governed by fixed and immutable laws derived from reason.
Spinoza’s view of nature leads him to dismiss the vast majority of religious beliefs and
practices as purely anthropological phenomena, while preserving a core of essential religious belief
which he defends through reason. Among the beliefs and practices which Spinoza dismisses is belief in
the occurrence of miracles, the authority of scriptural revelation, and the existence of a personal deity
as well as the practice of rituals in general. For Spinoza, these aspects of human religion cannot be
grounded in rational argumentation, so their origins must explained through anthropological
principles. However, in chapter fourteen of the TTP, Spinoza presents a number of fundamental
principles of faith, which he defends as objectively valid. Among these are a belief in God’s existence,
various basic features of God’s nature, and basic ethical principles.6 His defense of these principles in
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Ethics reveals that, for him, they follow as logical consequences of God’s nature. A contemporary
naturalist might argue that belief in the existence of God is inconsistent with naturalism. However,
since the existence of God, which Spinoza believed could be established by reason, is logically prior to
naturalism in the sense that Spinoza understood it, this does not reveal any inconsistency in Spinoza’s
view. Thus, both Spinoza’s rejection of traditional religion and his defense of purified religious belief
follow from his commitment to reason.
The manner in which Spinoza’s theoretical orientation has been introduced might make it
tempting to imagine Spinoza as having reached his ideas through pure philosophical reflection in
isolation from the intellectual climate of his times. After all, Spinoza clearly rejects the position of
traditional theologians; yet he clearly also rejects the skeptical attitude of figures like Isaac La Peyrère
whose primary goal was to cast doubt on traditional religious authority.7 In fact, in his philosophical
writings, Spinoza often treats the skeptic as a stubborn fool who is barely worth consideration by a
serious thinker. Yet, adopting the attitude that Spinoza’s ideas developed in an intellectual vacuum
would be a mistake. Not only would it wrongly ignore the substantial intellectual debt Spinoza owes to
many of his predecessors, but it would also obscure the very source of Spinoza’s originality.
Instead, I will argue that Spinoza is able to reach a unique position on religion by synthesizing
a number of seemingly disparate perspectives into a coherent and systematic view. In this manner, I
hope to show that it is Spinoza’s unusual historical position on the crossroads between a number of
heterogeneous intellectual traditions in conjunction with his own remarkable drive to combine these
perspectives into a coherent philosophical framework that led to his original contribution. This paper
will provide a narrative account of the development of Spinoza’s view of religion while considering
the known biographical details of his life. Thus, it will attempt to roughly follow the chronological
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order in which Spinoza was exposed to important ideas about religion beginning with the Jewish
philosophy of Moses Maimonides, proceeding to the political philosophy of Nicollò Machiavelli and
Thomas Hobbes, and ending with a discussion of the political climate of the Dutch republic.
Rational Religion in Maimonides
Moses Maimonides (1138-1204) was an Egyptian rabbi and is widely regarded as the most
significant medieval Jewish philosopher. Spinoza likely first became acquainted with Maimonides’
philosophy through his elementary education in the Talmud Torah school of the Amsterdam Jewish
community and probably went on to study him more extensively while attending Rabbi Mortera’s
Keter Torah adult study group in the early 1650s.8 This also must have been the period in which
doubts about Judaism were first emerging for the young Spinoza. According to his early biographer
Jean Maximillen Lucas, the young Spinoza frequently posed questions to his teachers, which they
found difficult to solve.9 One can imagine that he was frequently referred by these teachers to
Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed, the natural starting point for a philosophically inclined Jewish
thinker. Given his increasing tension with the Jewish community ending with expulsion in 1656,
Spinoza must not have been fully satisfied with the answers he found there.
Maimonides is one of the few authors to whom Spinoza refers explicitly in his writings. These
references are almost entirely critical and mostly concern Maimonides’ approach to scriptural passages
which conflict with philosophical reasoning. Yet, in many other passages, ideas clearly found in
Maimonides are presented by Spinoza as his own without any mention of their origin. Furthermore,
the fact that Maimonides had a decisive impact on the development of a number of aspects of
Spinoza’s philosophy is well-established in the secondary literature on the topic.10 In addition to cases
in which Spinoza more or less directly adopts a Maimonidean position, his philosophy is also enriched
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by critical reflection on Maimonides. In particular, critical reflection on Maimonides’ treatment of
religious beliefs led Spinoza to the view that some beliefs form an essential rational core, while others
cannot be rationally justified.
One of the overarching concerns of Maimonidean philosophy is showing that the revealed
truth of Mosaic Law is perfectly consistent with conclusions reached rationally through philosophical
reflection. In Maimonides’ case, this meant showing that Hebrew scripture is consistent with
Aristotelian philosophy. In the Aristotelian view, God is the unmovable mover who remains outside of
nature. According this view, “the world derives from the overflow of God…and He has cause to
overflow to it everything that is produced in time.”11 God is not aware of the particular beings which
result from the overflow of his eternal act of self-contemplation nor is he capable of undergoing any
change.12 While Spinoza’s own view of God differs in important respects from Aristotle’s, the
differences need not concern us here as each view is entirely abstract, rational, and impersonal.
This conception of God presents a number of problems to a devout Jewish rabbi such as
Maimonides. He is committed, at least outwardly, to maintaining that scriptural teachings are perfectly
true. He cannot simply reject scripture when it contradicts philosophical reasoning. Instead,
Maimonides strives to offer non-literal interpretations of difficult passages. For instance, consider his
treatment of the following passage from Genesis: “And Moses hid his face for he was afraid to look at
God.”13 Maimonides cannot accept that Moses was afraid to literally look upon God because this would
imply that Moses, the greatest prophet (and therefore the greatest philosopher for Maimonides),
thought God was an embodied entity who “can be apprehended by the eyes.”14 Instead, Maimonides
interprets this passage as utilizing a figure of speech in which looking upon God serves as a metaphor
for acquiring true knowledge. Moses, with his prophetic insight into God, was not literally afraid to
11
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look upon God; rather, his true fear was of making “categoric affirmations in favor of the first opinion
to occur to him” and erring in judgment.15
Insofar as this view of the relationship of reason and revelation is utilized as an approach to
the interpretation of scripture, Spinoza rejects the Maimonidean position. Spinoza directly attacks and
ridicules this view in a clear expression of intellectual frustration:
Maimonides and some others take the view that this and all other instances of the apparition
of an angel…occurred in dreams, on the ground that nobody could see an angel with his eyes
open. But this is mere rubbish. They are concerned only to extort from Scripture some
Aristotelian nonsense and some fabrications of their own; and this I regard as the height of
absurdity.16
There is only one other place in the Spinozistic corpus where Spinoza makes a similarly harsh attack
directed at a single figure. In that passage in Ethics, Spinoza derides Descartes’ dualistic philosophy of
mind, which he clearly views as absurd.17 In both cases, Spinoza’s frustration has the same basis. In
Spinoza’s view, each thinker has failed to rigorously pursue the clear implications of a position because
he sought to preserve some traditional belief. In the passage above, Spinoza describes Maimonides’
response to cases in which scripture contradicts his Aristotelian convictions. Instead of accepting
what, to Spinoza, is the obvious conclusion that scripture does not accurately teach scientific truth
about the world, Maimonides seeks to escape this conclusion by adopting a hermeneutical position that
allows him to resolve the apparent conflict without calling scripture into question. From Spinoza’s
perspective, Maimonides came within reach of the important realization that scripture is merely a
fallible human creation, but he turned away from this view because of his unwillingness to challenge
religious orthodoxy. As a philosopher whose work clearly testifies to his own high standards of
intellectual honesty in the face of distasteful conclusions, it makes sense that Spinoza would reserve
the highest contempt for those who failed to follow through with their own ideas.
15
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Yet, as the case of Descartes clearly shows, Spinoza did not simply ignore the views of figures
whom he believed had failed to follow through with their own ideas. Rather, he sought to push their
ideas to the very logical conclusions, which they had failed to accept. In Maimonides’ case, Spinoza’s
objection is easy to see. If a religious claim conflicts with a rationally supported argument, then one
should simply accept that the religious claim is mistaken. However, Spinoza is unable to stop at this
point. By rejecting scripture as a source of objective truth about the world, Spinoza risked being seen
as rejecting religion entirely. In order to avoid such a charge of atheism, Spinoza needed a way to
distinguish between those beliefs which he wished to maintain and those beliefs which he wished to
reject. In addition, if Spinoza wanted his views to have any chance at all of gaining support, he needed
to provide some account of religious beliefs which did not simply dismiss them as entirely worthless.
In each case, Spinoza’s solution has its origins in Maimonidean philosophy.
The solution to the problem of distinguishing between true religious beliefs and those which
should be rejected is already implicit in the recognition of Maimonides’ failure to pursue the logical
conclusion of his view. In many cases, Maimonides had no problem assenting to religious claims. For
instance, the claim that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and eternal easily falls within the Aristotelian
view. In other cases, there is significant tension in the Maimonidean outlook. In these cases, it is often
clear to the critical reader that the demands of Aristotelian philosophy conflict with some important
principle of Jewish faith in a manner that cannot be resolved by giving a figurative interpretation. In
these cases, it is often difficult to determine Maimonides’ true stance. This has led some commentators
to argue the Maimonides is presenting an orthodox view on the surface while truly holding a
thoroughly Aristotelian view, a fact which he partially conceals.18
Maimonides treatment of miracles provides an excellent example of such tension in his
philosophy. Belief in miracles, particularly in those miracles by which God delivered the people of
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Israel from slavery in Egypt, is an important element of the Jewish faith. Furthermore, belief in
miracles was widely accepted in the medieval period. Thus, it should not be surprising that
Maimonides accepts the possibility of at least some miracles in the Guide. This includes miracles
which Aristotle holds are impossible, such as changes in substance when God transforms water into
blood in Exodus.19 Yet, in a sign of his own awareness of the tension of his position, Maimonides
attempts, wherever possible, to give miracles other explanations.20 This raises the question of whether
or not Maimonides actually believed that miracles are possible or whether he was simply offering this
view in order to maintain an appearance of orthodoxy.21
Fortunately, the issues surrounding the intentions of Maimonides can be avoided in this
analysis. What is important is that as a critical reader of Maimonides’ Guide, Spinoza would have been
well-equipped to detect the tension in Maimonides’ position and consider the possibility that
Maimonides may have held less orthodox views that he outwardly claimed. This tension gave Spinoza
a clear basis for differentiating between those beliefs he wished to preserve and those he wished to
reject. Spinoza sets out this basis in chapter 13 of the TTP in which he argues that the aim of
scripture “was not to impart knowledge” except in the case of basic principles which “are very few, and
of a very simple nature.”22 He makes it clear that those principles which are found to be essential will
be fully supported within the domain of philosophical reasoning and will be shared by all true
religions. It is this division Spinoza has in mind when he writes in a letter to Henry Oldenburg, “the
chief distinction I make between religion and superstition is that the latter is founded on ignorance,
the former on wisdom.”23 In this way, Spinoza’s view of religion fits one possible interpretation of
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Maimonides in which he is truly a full-fledged Aristotelian but does not explicitly deny miracles so as
to avoid weakening the faith of the masses.
Spinoza’s second problem was that he needed to provide some sort of positive role for the
religious beliefs which he rejects in order to avoid appearing to attack religion. Maimonides provides
Spinoza with just such an account. In his philosophical system, Maimonides distinguishes between
those beliefs which are true and those which promote an orderly society.24 A good example of the
latter case can be found in Maimonides’ approach to ceremony in book III of the Guide. Maimonides
holds that “the law as a whole aims at two things: the welfare of the soul and the welfare of the
body.”25 When faced with an apparently arbitrary law, Maimonides will seek to show its social utility.
For instance, regarding laws concerning ritual purity, Maimonides argues that they are designed by
God to restrain sexual desire, which would otherwise degrade society.26
Spinoza adopts the Maimonidean account of ceremonial observances and non-essential
scriptural beliefs as existing because they are necessary for an orderly society. Spinoza argues that
“Scripture commands no other kind of knowledge other than what is necessary to obey God according
to [the commandment of loving one’s neighbor], and without which men are likely to be self-willed.”27
Thus, the belief and practices of scripture can be treated as useful lies, which have a good social effect
on the masses, but need not be believed by the philosopher. However, since Spinoza denies Maimonides’
explanation that these practices have their origins in the benevolent intentions of God, he must
provide some other account explaining their origins. For such an account, Spinoza turns to the account
of religion in the work of Nicollò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes.
The Origins of Religion in Machiavelli and Hobbes
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Spinoza most likely first became acquainted with the work of Machiavelli and Hobbes when he

was a student of Fransiscus van Enden, who wrote two political works around the same period.28 The
accounts of religion that influenced Spinoza are found in Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy and Hobbes’
Leviathan. There is direct evidence that Spinoza read Machiavelli as a copy of his complete works was
found in Spinoza’s library.29 In the case of Hobbes, the Leviathan was not found in his library though
Hobbes’ De Cive was among the books in his collection. However, Spinoza was almost certainly familiar
with the Dutch translation of his friend Abraham van Berckel, which had a significant impact on the
intellectual scene in the Netherlands.30
Whether Machiavelli or Hobbes was the primary influence on Spinoza’s anthropological
account of human religion is a question that cannot be conclusively answered. Hobbes clearly plays a
key role in the development of Spinoza’s political views in the TTP. Steven Nadler identifies Hobbes’
Leviathan as the principle source of Spinoza’s anthropological account of religion and does not
consider Machiavelli.31 However, Spinoza was already well under way in his work on the TTP in 1665
as is indicated by his correspondence with Henry Oldenburg, whereas the Leviathan did not appear in
any language that Spinoza could read until the Dutch translation in 1667.32 While Hobbes political
views could have been gleaned from De Cive, which was written in Latin, his anthropological account
of religion does not appear there. It is possible that Spinoza was able to access Berckel’s translation
prior to its publication date; however, it seems unlikely that Spinoza could have read the Leviathan
during the period in which his views on religion were first forming in the early 1660s, but he would
have read it by the publication of the TTP in 1670.
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The fact that Spinoza could have read Machiavelli as soon as he began studying with van Enden
lends credence to the view that Discourses was the primary source for Spinoza’s anthropological
account. However, it is uncertain whether or not Spinoza would have come into contact with the
particular passages that express this position. Since both Machiavelli and Hobbes express similar
views, there is no way to settle this matter by investigating the texts. For instance, both Machiavelli
and Hobbes restricted their consideration to pagan religions in order to avoid providing a controversial
account of Christianity.33 In the absence of conclusive evidence either way, I will proceed on the
plausible assumption that Spinoza was familiar with both texts and that each contributed to his
account of human religion.
Spinoza and Hobbes both identify human ignorance of natural causes combined with the
resulting uncertainty and fear this produces as the primary cause of the origin of most religious
beliefs. Spinoza describes the masses as “the wretched victims of alternating hopes and fears, the result
[of which] is that, for the most part, their credulity knows no bounds.”34 This clearly echoes Hobbes
own view by which mankind lives in perpetual fear.35 The problem, in each case, is that events occur in
nature whose natural cause cannot be immediately known. The result, according to Spinoza, is that “if
they struck with wonder at some unusual phenomenon, they believe this to be a portent signifying
anger of the god or of a supreme deity.”36 This argument also appears in the Leviathan, in which
Hobbes argues that “when [man] cannot assure himself of the true causes of things (for the cause of
good and evil fortune for the most part are invisible), he supposes causes of them.”37
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The next step in the process occurs when certain individuals either consciously or
unconsciously begin channeling the superstition of the masses for their own benefit. Machiavelli
provides such an account of Roman religion:
…every religion has the foundation of its life on some principle order of its own. The life of
the Gentile religion was founded on the responses of the oracles and on the sect of the diviners
and augurs. All their other ceremonies, sacrifices, and rites depended on them; for they easily
believed that the god who could predict your future good or your future ill for you could also
grant it to you. From these arose temple, from these the sacrifices, from these the supplications
and every other ceremony to venerate them.38
Such ceremonies and rituals become more and more developed until they reach the point of becoming
a fully institutionalized religion. Spinoza uses the Ottoman Turks as an example:
To counter this unfortunate tendency [of the masses being victims of alternating prejudices],
immense efforts have been made to invest religion, true or false, with such pomp and ceremony
that it can sustain any shock any constantly evoke the deepest reverence in all its worshippers.39
In this manner, the social utility of religion becomes part of the anthropological account of its origins.
What begins as the weakness of mankind to superstitions is transformed into a formal set of beliefs,
institutions, and ceremonies to benefit the interest of the elites in ruling an orderly and obedient
populace.40
Spinoza and Hobbes also use their narrative account of the development of superstitious
religious beliefs and ceremonies to explain the diversity of religious customs. As Spinoza puts it in the
TTP, “superstition, like all other influences of hallucination and frenzy, is bound to assume very
unstable and varied forms.”41 Hobbes makes the same argument in more elaborate form when he writes,
“by reason of the different Fancies, Judgments, and Passion of several men, have grown up into
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ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to
another.”42 In this manner, the anthropological account of the origins of human religion not only
explains the causal origin of irrational beliefs, but has the additional benefit of solving the otherwise
vexing problem of the existence of diverse religious traditions.
Skepticism, Toleration, and the New Sciences in the Netherlands
Spinoza’s account of human religion clearly owes much of its substance to reflection on the
work of philosophical writings of Maimonides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. However, these figures were
not interested in developing the radical implications of their own accounts of religion. Therefore,
while Spinoza certainly drew much of his philosophical analysis from these sources, it is unlikely that
they provided the impetus behind the radical direction in which he took their views. Instead, there is
reason to believe that the 17th century Dutch intellectual climate was the primary external factor
influencing Spinoza to take a radical direction. Spinoza would have had his first significant exposure to
these ideas when he began working as a merchant, which could have occurred no later than his father’s
death in 1649.43 The influence of these ideas would have increased after his excommunication in 1656
and would continue for the remaining twenty-one years of his life.
Skepticism about religion emerged, in its modern form, in the tumultuous period following the
Protestant Reformation. Before this time, those individuals who held broadly skeptical views about
religion either kept their ideas to themselves or were suppressed by religious authorities to the extent
that their ideas failed to achieve significant influence outside of their immediate circles. Two important
changes occurred in the early modern period. First, major philosophical works expressing skeptical
themes became more widely disseminated with the rise of the printing press and the proliferation of
religious writing spawned by the Reformation. Second, skeptical ideas began to circulate more widely
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in private intellectual circles and through personal contacts.44 Undoubtedly, the contents of these
private communications were often more radical than the published work that appeared in the period.
Amsterdam was a center of radical ideas, and it was home to a flourishing industry centered on
printing radical texts. Spinoza’s friend Jan Rieuwertszoon ran such a publishing business and owned a
bookstore that served as a meeting place for individuals with radical ideas.45 Since Spinoza clearly
frequented such circles, there can be little doubt that he was exposed to such positions. Among the
views discussed would have been the ideas of classical figures such as Epicurus as well as modern
skeptics such as Montaigne and Charron. Yet one must question what impact these ideas had on
Spinoza’s position since there is no clear evidence of their influence in his philosophy.
One response to skeptical arguments about religion is to use them to attack established
authority. Such an approach can be seen in the writings of Uriel Acosta, who committed suicide when
Spinoza was nine years old and lived in the same Jewish community in which Spinoza was raised. In his
Example of a Human Life, Acosta offers a harsh attack on the religious establishment of rabbinic
Judaism, which he blames for various personal misfortunes and for reducing its adherents to slavery. 46
Another response to skeptical arguments about religion is to incorporate them into a broader skeptical
view concerning knowledge in general. This approach can be seen in the writing of Montaigne who
used Pyrrhonian skepticism to argue that religion had no rational basis.47 Spinoza would have been
acquainted to each of these skeptical outlooks through his contact with the intellectual scene in
Amsterdam.
What is significant about these approaches is that Spinoza goes to great lengths to reject each
of them. Spinoza’s own view rejects undermining established political authority, and he is careful to
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emphasize that point in the TTP. Spinoza’s rejection of skepticism concerning knowledge is even more
striking. Not only is Spinoza’s own epistemology markedly anti-skeptical, but he treats the skeptical
figure as either ridiculous or insincere. Thus, it is unlikely that Spinoza held in high regard those who
expressed these kinds of skepticism about religion. This would also suggest that such ideas did not
have a strong influence on his philosophical views.
However, despite the fact that Spinoza did not share or even respect the broadly skeptical views
that he would have been exposed to in Amsterdam, there is good reason to believe that these ideas did
play a role in his philosophical development. Despite the flaws Spinoza must have seen in the views of
figures like Acosta and Montaigne, he must have agreed with them that the claims of religious
authorities should not be accepted without question. Thus, it is likely that the radical environment of
Amsterdam encouraged Spinoza to draw more radical conclusions from the work of figures such as
Hobbes and Machiavelli, whose philosophical depth he would have respected. In addition, skeptical
views would have made Spinoza sensitive to the vulnerability of religious claims to rational
argumentation. A natural response to this would be to seek some criterion for distinguishing between
religious claims that are rationally defensible and those that are not.
The skeptical outlook of the 17th century may explain why Spinoza chose to reject the objective
validity of the majority of religious beliefs in favor of providing naturalistic accounts of them;
however, it fails to explain why Spinoza sought to preserve a core of religious beliefs in his system.
Given the incendiary nature of much of Spinoza’s work, it can hardly be that he included this aspect to
appease religious authorities. Instead, this move was motivated, in part, by Spinoza’s own experience
of interacting with various liberal Christians in Amsterdam. In particular, I will focus on the influence
of the Collegiant circles, which Spinoza was known to frequent.
The Collegiants were groups of liberal Christians who met to pray and discuss theology in
various Dutch cities, including Amsterdam. The membership of such informal organizations was
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constituted primarily by Mennonites, Remonstrants, and Socinians.48 While these views share certain
affinities, they are not without differences on important theological points. At times, this led to
controversy within Collegiant circles.49 Yet, for the most part the Collegiants must have been fairly
tolerant in their approach to religious differences as evidenced by the fact that they accepted Spinoza, a
non-Christian, into their midst.
This relative peace was achievable because of a view among the Collegiants that only a few
simple truths were absolutely essential to Christianity. This view likely arose as a natural response to
the problem of maintaining peace among holders of diverse views within the Collegiant community.
Central to this position was the view that the primary focus of Jesus’ teachings was to love fellow
humans and that the Christian faith is not dogmatic in nature.50 This view is expressed, in much the
same form, by Spinoza when he presents his own view of the essential elements of religion in the
TTP.51 Thus, it seems highly probable that Spinoza’s decision to defend a purified core of religion had
its origins in the view of the Collegiant community of which he was a member. Yet, it is important to
remember that many of the Collegiants, unlike Spinoza, accepted spiritualism as a legitimate source of
religious belief. Thus, while Spinoza’s decision to defend a core of religious beliefs may have originated
with his exposure to liberal Christians, he does not entirely share their reasons for defending such an
approach, which he reached through reflection on Maimonides.
A final influence on Spinoza from the Dutch intellectual scene would have been the adherents
of the new sciences. There are a number of different routes by which Spinoza was influenced by the
beginnings of the scientific revolution and the mathematical view of the world that it advocated.
Descartes, who was a key influence on Spinoza’s philosophical work, was a major advocate of this new
way of thinking. Spinoza shows interest in this kind of thinking in his arguments concerning physics
48
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and astronomy in his Descartes’ Principles. In addition, Spinoza maintained a correspondence with the
English chemist Robert Boyle in which he actively discussed various experiments. Finally, Spinoza
supported himself as a lens grinder and is known to have had knowledge in optics from his
correspondence with Gottfried Leibniz.
In addition to the influences described above, Spinoza probably read the work of Joseph
Delmedigo early in his education. Delmedigo was a Jewish advocate of the new sciences and a student
of Galileo Galilei.52 His book on the new sciences, Sefer Elim, was published by Rabbi Menasseh ben
Israel of the Amsterdam community, and Spinoza was probably exposed to it at a relatively early age.53
This text likely added weight to Spinoza’s view of nature as a rational system of fixed mathematical
laws. However, the conception of nature as governed by rational laws is already found in the
philosophy of Maimonides; therefore, it is likely that Delmedigo’s work merely reinforced and was not
the origin of Spinoza’s naturalism. However, the powerful intellectual drive of advocates of the new
sciences towards a naturalistic view of the world likely had some influence on Spinoza.

The intellectual origins of Spinoza’s account of religion in the diverse intellectual traditions
which influenced his development should now be apparent. The substantive analysis of his position is
largely drawn from philosophical influences. His decision to divide religious beliefs into a rationally
defensible core and a larger set of beliefs to be justified through their social utility has its origins in
critical reflection on Maimonides. The anthropological account of the origin of religions he provides
in the preface to the TTP can be seen as a more radical version of the accounts provided by
Machiavelli and Hobbes. However, while the analysis came from these philosophical sources, the drive
to draw radical implications requires a different explanation. Some of it must be explained in terms of
Spinoza’s inner drive to push theories to their logical conclusion and his willingness to accept
52
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distasteful consequences. Yet, much of the impetus likely came from the radical intellectual climate of
Amsterdam at the time. Spinoza’s unusual place in the crossroads of each of these influences as well as
his drive to systematize his views led to the account of human religion that he provides in the TTP.
Now that the development of Spinoza’s account has been explained, one might wonder what
Spinoza made of his own position. One clear implication of Spinoza’s account is that so long as one
preserves the essential philosophical core of true religion, any number of inessential religious beliefs
could be embraced to serve as moral guidance. Spinoza embraced this implication as is clear from his
response to a letter accusing him of providing no way to distinguish between the false prophet
Mohammed and the true prophets of the Judeo-Christian tradition:
As for the Turks and the Gentiles, if they worship God by the exercise of justice and by
love of their neighbor, I believe they possess the spirit of Christ and are saved, whatever
conviction they may hold in their ignorance regarding Mahomet and the oracles.54
This passage anticipates the ecumenical views of many contemporary authors in the debate on the
problem of religious diversity. For instance, John Hick advocates for a philosophical conception of
religion that can both give a realistic interpretation of certain core elements of religion and render
diverse faiths compatible.55 This view was, in some respect, anticipated by Moses Mendelssohn in
Jerusalem in which he advocates a rationalistic view of religion and a broadly ecumenicalist attitude
that may have been influenced by Spinoza.56
Yet Spinoza differs in important respects from contemporary ecumenicalists. First of all,
Spinoza is largely unconcerned about whether or not religious people will accept his account of their
religion. While he preserves a core of religious beliefs which can be defended objectively, he dismisses
the vast majority of beliefs as mere prejudices. Very few faithful adherents of any major religion could
ever accept Spinoza’s dramatic revision of the content of religion. In this manner, Spinoza shares the
54
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approach of the contemporary irrealist in his approach to religious belief. 57 Like the contemporary
irrealist, Spinoza defends the majority of religious beliefs on the ground that they lead to good ethical
behavior. Thus, Spinoza’s account anticipates a number of contemporary positions on religious
diversity while not fitting neatly into any single popular account in the philosophical literature.
The fact that Spinoza seems to fall in between all the major positions in both the early modern
and contemporary debates concerning the correct account of religion might lead one to suspect that
his view is, in some manner, inconsistent. Such an objection would begin by pointing out that Spinoza
gives two entirely different accounts of religious belief. He defends a small set of core beliefs as
objectively valid, yet he dismisses the vast majority of beliefs and gives an anthropological account. If
Spinoza could not provide principled reasons from within his philosophical system for this differential
treatment, then one could rightly object that his position is inconsistent.
On further investigation, this worry proves to be unfounded. In each case, Spinoza’s treatment
of religious beliefs is grounded in his commitment to reason. Certain core beliefs can be defended
because they follow logically from basic definitions and axioms which are known through the natural
light of reason. All other beliefs, by virtue of the fact that they cannot be so derived, are necessarily
invalid insofar as they are taken to represent objective truths about the world. However, they must be
given some explanation, by virtue of the fact that everything in nature behaves according to fixed laws.
Instead, their origin is explained in terms of various psychological features of human beings. In this
manner, Spinoza’s dual treatment of religious belief turns out to be deeply motivated by his
philosophical system.
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‡ Revisiting Joseph Campbell’s The Power of Myth ‡

1

First published in 1988, The Power of Myth is the companion to Bill Moyers’ acclaimed
television profile of Joseph Campbell.2 Power is comprised of eight transcribed conversations between
Moyers, a theologian-turned-journalist,3 and Campbell, a comparative mythologist. Campbell, a
meticulous prose writer, initially resisted the idea of transcribing the spoken interviews, but Moyers’
choice of editor, Betty Sue Flowers, whom Moyers described as “herself interested in this realm of the
spirit and in mythology,”4 persuaded Campbell to authorize the project and help Flowers in editing the
volume.5 In her introduction to The Power of Myth, Flowers stresses the “rich abundance of material”
captured in the interviews, and she speaks of Campbell with reverence, describing him as
“[answering] Moyers’ penetrating questions with self-revealing honesty, based on a lifetime of living
with myth.”6 Flowers’ introduction, combined with Bill Moyers’ description of Flowers as a spiritually
minded person, suggests that The Power of Myth was assembled not so much as an academic text, but
rather to give Campbell and his mystical ideas the most flattering showcase possible.
Although myth remains the primary focus of the book, the interviews delve heavily into
philosophy and religion. Campbell outlines his concept of the monomyth7—a fundamental hero’s
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journey underlying all of the world’s stories8—and presents myth as a way to provide a moral
education.9 The professor also articulates his personal philosophy, “Follow your bliss,”10 praises
authenticity and romantic love,11 and expresses his disappointment in a world that he believes to be
losing its mythological basis.12
Twenty-five years later, both the book and the series DVD remain in print,13 indicating that
Campbell’s ideas continue to resonate with the general public. Campbell’s ideas have gained some
traction in academia, too. Notably, Thomas C. Foster’s widely read textbook, How to Read Literature
Like a Professor, devotes an entire chapter to Campbell’s theory that all stories are the same story.14
Indeed, my high school English teachers taught the monomyth theory as if it was the only way to
interpret mythology. Given the popularity of Campbell’s ideas and the approaching twenty-fifth
anniversary of Power, the text merits a new critical reading. In this paper, I will consider the relevance
of The Power of Myth to the secular study of religion. By “secular study of religion,” I mean the
academic approach that eschews theology, focuses only on the empirical, observable aspects of
religious practice, and does not consider one religious tradition to be inherently superior to another.

Joseph Campbell was, first and foremost, a teacher, not a field researcher. In The Power of Myth,
which reads like an introductory survey of comparative mythology and religion, Joseph Campbell
borrows from the work of many other religious scholars. However, it is difficult to recognize
8

Ibid., 136.
Ibid., 4, 163.
10
Ibid., 118.
11
Ibid., 185-205.
12
Ibid., 82, 84, 131.
13
“Joseph Campbell on Power of Myth with Bill Moyers,” Amazon, accessed December 4, 2012, http://www.amazon.com/JosephCampbell-Power-Myth-Moyers/dp/B003SXHZEA/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1354646550&sr=81&keywords=joseph+campbell+and+the+power+of+myth; “The Power of Myth [Paperback],” Amazon, accessed December 4, 2012,
http://www.amazon.com/The-Power-Myth-Joseph-Campbell/dp/0385418868/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1354646642&sr=81&keywords=the+power+of+myth.
14
Thomas C. Foster, How to Read Literature Like a Professor: A Lively and Entertaining Guide to Reading Between the Lines (New York:
HarperCollins, 2003), 185-192.
9

76

Dan Gorman, Jr.: Revisiting Joseph Campbell’s The Power of Myth

Campbell’s sources, due to the book’s conversational structure and lack of a bibliography. Identifying
the scholars from whom Campbell draws is therefore the first step in analyzing The Power of Myth.
Campbell’s sources can be divided into three primary groups—the qualitative studies of religion, the
empirical (or fully social-scientific) studies of religion, and the studies that blend the two approaches.
Rudolf Otto and Mircea Eliade are the most significant qualitative intellectuals who inform Campbell’s
discourse. The research of these men reflects a bygone era, when theology, not religious studies,
dominated academia, and belief in God was a native category (i.e., considered objective and “a
foundational taxonomic concept” of society).15 According to Otto, religion encompasses non-rational,
or numinous, elements.16 In the presence of the numen, humans experience the mysterium tremendum,
feeling of holy dread and awe, and then recognize God’s tremenda majestas.17 Campbell appropriates
Otto’s terminology, describing myth as “a mysterium…tremendum et fascinans.”18 A discussion of
cathedrals, which draw the individual’s attention to the sacred or numen, greatly resembles Otto’s
reflections on sacred space and art.19
Just as Otto assumes there is a numen, Eliade asserts that there is a genuine sacred, which
manifests itself in physical objects.20 Humans build their lives around sacred religious sites
(particularly the axis mundi, the world’s holy center) and convey divine truth through rituals.21 Eliade
contends that secularism is weakening symbolism and ritual, preventing men from reaching their full
spiritual potential.22 More so than Rudolf Otto, Eliade has a pronounced effect on Campbell’s thinking.
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In what reads like a direct quote from Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane, Campbell states that, “The
center of the world is the axis mundi, the central point, the pole around which all revolves.”23 Other
Eliade-style passages reveal Campbell’s thoughts on ritual,24 which, in his view, links “the individual to
a larger morphological structure”25 and encourages humans to “live spiritually.”26 Eliade’s portrayal of
weakened ritual in the modern day resurfaces in Campbell’s claim that “the rituals that once conveyed
inner reality are now merely form.”27 Finally, Campbell’s description of a non-rational transcendent
energy to which men respond is analogous to Eliade’s sacred, as well as Otto’s numen.28
The second camp from which Campbell draws, blending the older belief in religion’s innate
qualities with social science’s emphasis on concrete data, includes William James, Peter Berger, and
Wilfred Cantwell Smith. These men are empiricists and open to new innovations in social science, but
they still believe that some sort of greater sacred is out there.29 William James represents a midway
point between the 19th century’s theological, qualitative study of religion and the 20th century’s
secular, empirical study of religion. According to James, the sacred inspires strong emotion in
individuals: “There must be something solemn, serious, and tender about any attitude which we
denominate religious.”30 By using emotional rhetoric to characterize religion, James (like Otto and
Eliade before him) implies that religion has given qualities. Throughout The Power of Myth, it is
apparent that Campbell shares James’ faith in religion’s qualities.31 Although James has his solemn
sacred, however, he is also a psychologist who cites a seemingly endless number of case histories to
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describe different religious experiences.32 Professor Campbell uses a similar technique in framing his
argument, citing a tremendous number of world myths to support his qualitative theory of universal
stories and themes.
Campbell’s vision, wherein all myths are considered equal to each other, also resembles the
conclusion of James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience. In the final pages of that book, James argues
that many gods (not only the Christian god) could be considered real, for all world religions provide
divine solutions to earthly problems.33 This assertion is surprisingly progressive for a man writing in
an overwhelmingly Christian era. For this reason, James points toward the religious pluralism of the
late 20th century, when Campbell did most of his teaching and writing. Indeed, Campbell eschews any
viewpoint that privileges the Judeo-Christian tradition, arguing that the Hebrews and their spiritual
successors stifled many traditional myths, including myths favoring women.34 Both James and
Campbell clearly believe that one must look around the world, and not just in enclaves of EuropeanAmerican Christians, for spiritual truth.
Writing several decades after James, Berger contends that religion creates plausibility
structures, or sacred canopies—structured belief systems that place a meaningful order (nomos) onto the
world.35 This concept of religiously constructed order resurfaces in The Power of Myth, when Bill
Moyers asks if myth “harmonize[s] our lives with reality,” and Campbell says yes.36 Campbell also
shares Berger’s distaste for secularization. According to Berger, secularization destabilizes mankind’s
longstanding plausibility structures, inspiring “severe anomy and existential anxiety.”37 Similarly,
Campbell cites secularization as a cause of civil disorder.38 To these men, a desacralized,
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demythologized world is not a positive development.39 One key difference between Berger and
Campbell, though, is that Berger partly blames religious pluralism for the destabilization of sacred
canopies,40 whereas Campbell takes James’ side in favor of pluralism. As such, Campbell and James are
arguably more optimistic than Berger.
W.C. Smith’s blend of the qualitative and empirical approaches shows a certain degree of
optimism, as well. Smith believes that scholars should abandon the abstract term religion, which lacks a
clear definition.41 Instead, scholars should study the cumulative tradition (i.e., the history and material
culture of religious individuals) and, more importantly, personal faith.42 According to Smith, a greater
appreciation of the faith of different religious groups “might contribute to…constructing a
brotherhood on Earth deserving the loyalty of all our groups.”43 In other words, an appreciation of
religion’s qualitative aspects can foster the interfaith movement. Just as Smith argues that multiple
religions can access faith, Campbell argues that divinity exists in all men, and it is the responsibility of
individuals to recognize the divinity in their peers.44 Additionally, both Smith and Campbell critique
the Judeo-Christian tradition: Campbell feels that the Hebrews displaced the place of women in
religious mythology,45 while Smith believes that Christians are too often insensitive to the faith found
within other religious traditions.46
Wayne Proudfoot and Jonathan Z. Smith, the postmodern empirical scholars who began
writing during Campbell’s later years, do not take faith into account, nor do they discuss a sacred-
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numen, which is, in truth, an unverifiable, subjective concept.47 Instead, Proudfoot and J.Z. Smith focus
solely on what W.C. Smith called the cumulative tradition—religion’s observable phenomena (i.e.,
empirical evidence). When articulating his secular, social-scientific approach to religion, J.Z. Smith
invokes the “map is not territory” argument: The academy creates religion, and so scholars of religion
must take care to ask good questions, lest they produce inaccurate or biased models (maps) of
religion.48 For Western scholars, an accurate map is one that does not treat Westerners as the makers
of history and Easterners as the objects of history.49 As previously outlined, Joseph Campbell draws
heavily from the qualitative and the half-qualitative, half-empirical schools of thought, but his critique
of the Judeo-Christian tradition and championing of international mythic structures greatly resembles
Smith’s call for non-Western-centric studies of religion. In this slight way, Campbell shows some
agreement with postmodernism.
In Religious Experience, a discussion of methodological problems in the study of religion,
Proudfoot stresses the careful collection and interpretation of data. Secular scholars must avoid
descriptive reduction, “the failure to identify an emotion, practice, or experience under the description
by which the subject identifies it.”50 Descriptive reduction prevents scholars from recognizing the
nuances of religious phenomena. Meanwhile, scholars should engage in explanatory reduction,
“offering an explanation of experience in terms that are not those of the subject and that might not
meet with his approval.”51 Explanatory reduction therefore seeks accurate solutions underlying the
details of religious experiences. In Map Is Not Territory, J.Z. Smith offers an excellent justification for
explanatory reduction: “There can only be a relatively limited number of systems or archetypes [i.e.,
explanations], though there may be an infinite number of manifestations [i.e., descriptions of
47
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religious phenomena].”52 Campbell’s concept of the monomyth—the fundamental paradigm of the
hero’s journey underlying many diverse myths—is an example of correctly executed explanatory
reduction.53 In spite of this fact, which might again suggest some sympathy with the late 20 th-century
empirical approach and postmodernism, Campbell engages in considerable descriptive reduction, a
problem that I will explore later in this article.
Aside from the material he borrows from other writers, Campbell also throws his personal
philosophical views into this theoretical mix. To a great extent, these ideas lack a direct correlation to
the theories of religion outlined so far in the present work. Separately from his combination of
theories, Campbell proposes his own religious plausibility structures, as he tries to establish universal
principles found in mythology. Professor Campbell stresses the importance of personal experience and
finding bliss.54 He lauds the goddess traditions, describing women as representative of creation.55
Humans must accept the hero’s journey, which includes suffering and venturing into new places.56 One
part of the hero’s journey is learning to love, which involves learning to be courageous.57 Ultimately,
individuals must find sublime peace, a feeling of wonder that cannot be conveyed fully in words.58
Having mapped the extensive theoretical origins of Campbell’s discourse, let us briefly
summarize The Power of Myth’s key implications. Campbell believes that there is a sacred or numen,
which he describes as an abstract energy. Humans respond to this energy by creating myths, which
give meaning to human life. The monomyth structure appears in the stories of most societies,
indicating that there are universal principles and that religion possesses given qualities. The JudeoChristian tradition superseded many traditional myths and rituals; secularization weakened mankind’s
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mythological knowledge further, inspiring civil chaos. However, individuals can rediscover myth and
follow the ancient principles, namely the need to follow one’s bliss, pursue romantic love, honor
women, and recognize the divinity in other people. Seeing the divinity in all humans can aid the
ecumenical and interfaith movements, while a rediscovery of myth can restore a layer of spiritual
meaning that modern secular society lacks.
Joseph Campbell’s interpretation of myth and religion—a theoretical mélange—makes for
intellectually engaging literature. Since Campbell draws from several modes of academic religious
inquiry, he clearly strives for intellectual synthesis. He wants to propose new interpretations of
religious myth, harmonizing two centuries of religious theory in the process. Professor Campbell’s
goal is laudable, but his argument is characterized by seven pronounced tensions. As Campbell shifts
between scholarly camps, which are all jumbled together in his monomythic vision, these tensions
become increasingly apparent and difficult to reconcile. My analysis of these tensions (or
“incongruities,” to borrow J.Z. Smith’s terminology)59 is somewhat anecdotal, but I feel that this
structure is appropriate, given the anecdotal format of The Power of Myth.
(1) Campbell tends to speak of myth as if it is an eternal, self-evident construct, produced by
the transcendent unity and elemental energy of which he frequently speaks.60 As critic Robert S.
Ellwood notes, “For [Campbell], a myth seem[s] to be a rather disembodied, timeless story of eternal
human significance.”61 Elsewhere in Power, however, Campbell asserts that myth harmonizes the world
with stories.62 This claim is a concession that man constructs myth. By describing myth as almost a
product of nature, yet also describing it as an empirical creation of mankind, Campbell contradicts
himself. This contradiction speaks to the irreconcilable gap between the theological belief in religion’s
59
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qualities and the secular belief in religion’s lack of qualities. These antithetical ideas cannot effectively
be synthesized.
(2) In the course of the interviews with Moyers, Campbell praises knowing one’s intellectual
limits.63 Meanwhile, Professor Campbell proposes forward his own system of spiritual beliefs. He
speaks as though he has discovered an absolute, universal set of principles underlying all of the
world’s religious traditions. In other words, Campbell speaks like a prophet revealing the secrets of the
cosmos, or a hermeneute manipulating the canon of religious stories to convey a certain point.64 If he
is a prophet, then Campbell is suffering from some degree of intellectual arrogance. If he is a
hermeneute, then Campbell is being selective with his data. His plausibility structure of bliss and
heroism is therefore not a universal truth, but rather one man’s subjective interpretation of mythology.
(3) Campbell says that he does not oppose modern technology, which is a by-product of
secularization and historical progress.65 With that said, Campbell repeatedly expresses reservations
about computer technology, even going so far as to call his first computer “an Old Testament god with
a lot of rules and no mercy.”66 The supremacy of the human mind over technology becomes a
recurring motif throughout The Power of Myth. Notably, when Campbell analyzes the Star Wars
trilogy in terms of comparative mythology, he stresses the positive triumph of the intuition-trusting
Luke Skywalker over the mechanistic Darth Vader.67 Of course, the symbolism in Star Wars is not
subtle at all, but Campbell the hermeneute chooses to stress this symbolic victory of humans over
technology. As such, Campbell shows something of a reactionary streak toward the modern world,
which he believes to be stripping humanity of its mythological foundations. Indeed, as Ellwood relates,
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“Campbell…prided himself on not really being part of the modern world. He never watched television
and had no interest in popular culture.”68
(4) Campbell’s philosophical beliefs, emphasizing the pursuit of bliss and love, are heavily
oriented toward individual experience. Although Campbell does discuss some examples of group
rituals, which teach men to “live spiritually,”69 the majority of his thought is oriented towards
individuals. According to Ellwood, Campbell considered himself a classical conservative; moreover,
Ellwood contends that, “[Campbell’s] mythic model is clearly the free enterprise ‘rugged individualist’
of a romanticized American past.”70 It is beyond the scope of this paper (and, frankly, Ellwood’s short
review) to assess thoroughly a link between American conservatism and Campbell’s individualist
sacred canopy. Still, there is definitely a “self-made man” tinge to Campbell’s rhetoric. The role of the
individual in uncovering myth’s power is therefore one of Campbell’s native categories.
(5) As explained earlier, Campbell’s theory of the monomyth successfully meets J.Z. Smith and
Proudfoot’s criteria for explanatory reduction. However, Campbell has a tendency to engage in
descriptive reduction, which Proudfoot discourages, since descriptive reduction ignores the differences
between individuals’ religious experiences. When discussing myth, Campbell jumps abruptly around
the world, arguing that all myths are the same.71 In his most glaring instance of descriptive reduction,
when discussing Jesus and the Buddha, Campbell states that “[y]ou can match those two savior figures
right down the line, even to the roles and characters of their immediate disciples or apostles.”72 In
other words, Campbell regards the details of both a Hindu and Christian myth as interchangeable. It is
clear, then, that Campbell usually skims over the details of different religious contexts.
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I say “usually” skims over because Campbell later contradicts himself in regard to the
descriptive reduction. A few pages after his initial reduction of the Jesus and Buddha narratives,
Campbell alters his position: “The messages of the great teachers—Moses, the Buddha, Christ,
Mohammed—differ greatly.73 But their visionary journeys are much the same.”74 In this case, the
reduced explanation of the journey—the monomyth—remains the same, but Campbell now accounts
for unique details (i.e., the different messages) in each narrative. Are the details—the descriptions—of
the Jesus and Buddha narratives exactly the same, or are they very different? Campbell never resolves
this tension between descriptive reductionism and descriptive expansionism. This tension is
problematic, suggesting that Campbell uses or does not use descriptive reduction on a case-by-case
basis. Overall, the arbitrariness and potential for bias within Campbell’s analysis of religious data
detract from the intellectual credibility of The Power of Myth.
(6) Like James, Otto, Eliade, W.C. Smith, and Berger, Professor Campbell believes that myth
(and, by extension, religion) possesses genuine qualities. This view aligns not with pure social science,
but rather with theology. Campbell’s belief in a qualitative interpretation of religion is therefore an
intellectual holdover from a less secular era. Considering that Campbell was in his eighties when he
participated in this interview series, perhaps Campbell’s fondness for older modes of thinking is
understandable. Still, Campbell’s support for certain qualities of myth robs his argument of some of
the empirical rigor one would expect from a late-1980s religion study.
(7) Campbell plucks ideas selectively from the secular-empirical tradition, the theisticqualitative tradition, and the half-qualitative, half-empirical tradition. As such, to which faction of the
study of religion does Campbell truly belong? Is Campbell a theist or non-theist? On the one hand,
Campbell denies any belief in a personal god,75 stating unequivocally that Jesus’ ascension into Heaven
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is a scientific impossibility.76 Meanwhile, Campbell speaks enthusiastically about genuine mysteries in
the world, a divinity in all people, and a mysterious energy to which people respond through religious
myth. There is some form of spirituality behind his discourse. Campbell is therefore trying to be
empirical and qualitative, secular and religious, progressive and reactionary, all at once. He belongs
neither to the purely empirical nor the purely qualitative school of religion. Rather, he is in line with
W.C. Smith, William James, and Peter Berger, those thinkers who attempted (somewhat unsuccessfully)
to meld the new techniques of secular scholarship and social science with classical theistic arguments.
Indeed, in addition to his comparative discussion of world mythology, Campbell wants to establish
new plausibility structures of his own (bliss, love, etc.). He wants his readers to develop theological (or,
as he might put it, mythological) beliefs, so he cannot be regarded as a secular intellectual.
If the continuing sales of The Power of Myth are any indication, the general public has no
problem with Campbell’s non-secular claims. However, the secular scholar of religion cannot accept
this book into the pantheon of classic social science monographs. Under his façade of academic rigor
and pithy quotes, Campbell preaches a subjective theology. For this reason, The Power of Myth should
not be categorized with truly secular books like J.Z. Smith’s Map Is Not Territory and Émile Durkheim’s
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.

In his ruminations on world mythology and religion, Campbell combines the qualitative and
empirical traditions with a healthy dose of his own personal philosophy. Surprisingly, he weaves these
competing theories and personal anecdotes into a remarkably coherent discourse. Campbell is eloquent
and passionate, and Bill Moyers contributes genuinely interesting questions, lending a strong Socratic
aspect to the interviews. The text includes some intriguing claims about mythology, and Campbell’s
plea to follow one’s bliss and find love is rather moving. Still, Campbell’s argument contains
76
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irreconcilable tensions and far too much reductionism. The Power of Myth does not belong in the same
category as thoroughly secular, empirical studies of religion. Rather, the text is a work of popular
philosophy—the last lecture of Joseph Campbell, who died not long after the interviews were
conducted.77
Nonetheless, The Power of Myth may remain of some interest to secular academics. The book is
akin to one of J.Z. Smith’s incongruous maps, which are “incapable of overcoming disjunction,” yet are
capable of “[playing] between the incongruities and [providing] an occasion for thought.”78 Campbell
may use outdated intellectual models, and his argument cannot withstand the contemporary secular
scrutiny demanded by J.Z. Smith and Wayne Proudfoot, but he does make readers think deeply about
the comparative study of mythology and religion. Readers must recognize the limits of Campbell’s
map, though, when they set out on their journey.
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Bogdan, Henrik and Martin P. Starr, eds. Aleister Crowley and Western Esotericism. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012. 432 pp. ISBN-10: 0199863091
One of the most famous occultists of the twentieth century was Aleister Crowley. He was
known as the wickedest man in the world (p.35), primarily because of his outright rejection of
Christianity and his total embrace of magick, particularly of the sexual variety. This “magick” was not
traditional stage performance, but a ritual magic that utilized the energy of the universe to enable a
person to reach his or her “True Will,” (p.340). or ultimate destiny, without the interference of social
dictates. With his creation of the spiritual system Thelema, Crowley changed the face of Western
esotericism. Henrik Bogdan and Martin P. Starr provide a new, complex perspective on Crowley in
their anthology, Aleister Crowley and Western Esotericism, which features for the first time an in-depth
critical analysis of the controversial figure (p.3). The collection, which is divided into fifteen essays,
features larger topics such as Crowley’s intellectual interests, his spiritual involvement in Eastern and
Western traditions, his inspirations, and the impact he had on new religions. Bogdan and Starr’s goal is
to show that “he was an influential twentieth-century religious synthesist. His esotericism was not a
reversion to a medieval worldview; instead, in its questing for a vision of the self, it was a harbinger of
modernity” (ibid). Crowley sought to bring occultism into the new century.
This anthology features a wide range of prestigious academics whose areas of expertise
include Western esotericism, spirituality, paganism, and the study of both old and new religious
movements, all of which adds new depth to our understanding of Crowley’s occultist legacy. Several
themes emerge from the anthology. It becomes clear that Freud’s concepts of the id, ego, and superego
were a basis for Crowley’s ideas, enabling him to be at the forefront of the modernization of magick.
He was a spiritual explorer who embraced both Eastern and Western esoteric traditions. For example,
he incorporated the Eastern practices of yoga and tantra into magical orders such as Ordo Templi
Orientis (p.10), and, though Thelema was overtly anti-Christian, he was also influenced by Western
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apocalyptic and millenarian ideas rooted in Christianity. In addition, he may have been influenced by
little-known sources such as the Kurdish religion Yezidism.
The anthology’s contributors elaborate on Crowley’s relationships with other groups (e.g. the
Free Masons) and individuals (e.g. A. E. Waite). These relationships reveal Crowley’s desire both to
maintain his respectability within English society and to be involved in magick (p.272). However,
Crowley was unable to balance the two as effectively as Waite. The anthology also explores Crowley’s
relationships with deceased people; for example, he was fascinated by leaders like Joseph Smith, the
founder of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Crowley saw many “extrinsic” similarities
between Smith and himself: both founded new religions, felt persecuted for their new religious ideas,
and received their texts mystically (ibid). Lastly, Crowley became an influential figure for new religions
of the twentieth century such as Wicca, Scientology, and Satanism. Interspersed among these central
themes are narratives of Crowley’s experiences, which provide the reader with a glimpse into the
thought process of this mysterious figure. Each of the authors tries to present Crowley in a manner
that reveals more dimensions of his practice of magick and moves beyond the image of Crowley as a
wicked man to a more nuanced portrait of a modernist who tried to reinvent religion for a new age.
The book is significant not only for its portrayal of Crowley himself but also for its
exploration of his legacy. Crowley not only inspired many countercultural figures but also generated
innovative concepts that provided a structure for spiritual systems outside of a monotheistic context.
Hugh B. Urban’s chapter on L. Ron Hubbard’s Scientology is particularly striking: one would not
imagine that so modern a movement as Scientology would have taken a cue from Crowley’s writing.
This anthology offers powerful confirmation that religious traditions do not develop in a static vacuum
but rather are constantly influencing and being influenced by other faiths and beliefs. Without
Crowley’s Thelema, religions such as Wicca would not have had any foundation.
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On the whole, the book’s scholarship is excellent. The articles make use of primary archival sources
from the Warburg Institute and the University of Texas Harry Ransom Center. The authors could
have made greater use of other archives, such as those at the Pennsylvania State University and
University of Virginia libraries, but archival material relevant to Crowley at these other libraries is
admittedly less comprehensive.
Readers should bear in mind that this anthology is geared toward scholars who have a working
understanding of Western esotericism. The lay reader may wonder how the authors define Western
esotericism. A footnote at the end of the introduction implies that there are multiple definitions (p.13).
Esotericism may be identified with what Crowley calls “occultism,” but his description of occultism as
the “demonic ‘other’” only indicates that it is “dark” in relation to Christianity. Since the anthology
does not discuss Crowley’s biography extensively, before reading this anthology readers would benefit
from an introductory biography such as Richard Kaczynski’s Perdurabo: The Life of Aleister Crowley.
Though Aleister Crowley’s aura of mystery does not dissipate after reading this anthology, the
reader will certainly gain a greater appreciation of the development of Western esotericism in the
twentieth century.
ALLISON SCHOTTENSTEIN
University of Texas-Austin
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Howard, Thomas Albert. God and the Atlantic: America, Europe, and the Religious Divide. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011. 272 pp. ISBN 9780199565511
In 2004, German essayist Peter Schneider weighed in on the growing “trans-Atlantic religious
divide.” Among other colorful indicators, he cited “a majority of respondents” in the United States who
“told pollsters that they believed in angels, while in Europe the issue was apparently considered so
preposterous that no one even asked the question.”1 Magnified by U.S. foreign policy, the disparity
between European and American religiosity, with its attendant divisions on political and social
questions, has increasingly agitated cultural commentators in recent years. But agitated European
discourse on American religiosity has deeper historical roots.
Enter Thomas Albert Howard, Stephen Phillips Chair of History and Director of the Center
for Faith and Inquiry at Gordon College. Howard sets as his task the recovery of a “substrate of prior
cultural and religious factors” that haunts our perceptions of contemporary “trans-Atlantic realities”
and informs, however invisibly, contemporary anti-Americanism in Europe (p.4). Howard recovers
valuable nineteenth- and early twentieth-century commentators on American religion from
Tocqueville’s shadow, organizing them broadly into two camps: a host of America’s cultured despisers
in Europe and an immigrant and an émigré (Philip Schaff and Jacques Maritain), both turned
apologists, in America.
Criticisms of the American religious scene came from the right and the left—a Traditionalist
and a Secularist critique. Within the former, Howard identifies three particular streams of thought. To
British Anglicans (including Frances Trollope, Charles Dickens, and Matthew Arnold), voluntarism
produced social chaos, sectarianism led to theological indifference, and “the democratization of
American Christianity” fostered rampant supernaturalism. For Continental Romantics, like Schlegel,
Schopenhauer, and Heine, “worldly practicality” was the “true religion” of Americans, and
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“money…their only almighty God” (p.53). The succeeding generation of German scholars saw
America’s Geistlosigkeit (spiritlessness) typified by the likes of Billy Sunday, while Heidegger bemoaned
the culturally catastrophic amalgamation of American democracy and Christianity. Finally, Catholic
ultramontanes viewed American religion as a reflection of the French Revolution, the revolutions of
1848-49, and Protestant private judgment—cumulatively the Church’s very antithesis. Interestingly,
for all of the above Mormonism epitomized the disastrous results of American religion—the end
product of democratized and uneducated religious impulse or a Catholic parody posing as panacea for
Protestant divisiveness.
Perhaps more enduringly influential have been the Secularist critics. Their various camps have
shared a developmental view of historical progress that precluded the persistence of primitive
religion. Purveyors included early French social scholars, from Condorcet to Saint-Simon and Auguste
Comte, as well as “the influential trajectory of thought from Hegel to Marx” and its myriad offshoots.
A third group was the republican anti-clericals who “felt that realizing the Revolution’s full potential
entailed a relentless assault on ecclesiastical influence” (p.87). Fleeing to the U.S. after the failed 1848
revolutions, they were horrified by the enduring influence of disestablished religion in America.
Howard argues that each of these camps helped turn the “secularization thesis” into a “monopolizing
master narrative about modernity.” Drawing from Charles Taylor, Howard sees the “secularization
thesis” as a “social imaginary”—an unexamined background assumption, neither pure theory nor pure
experience—with enduring power to construct social realities as a self-fulfilling prophecy (p.88).
Howard’s foray into the secularization and modernity debate perhaps helps explain his selective
focus on Schaff and Maritain. Prophets of secularization from Condorcet to Heidegger, perplexed by
America’s divergence from their meta-narrative of modernization, spoke ill of American religiosity
while largely eschewing empirical observation. Schaff and Maritain both spent decades in America and
Europe and became convinced that American religion “too often had been subjected to
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misapprehension and caricature” by European intellectuals (p.138). In Howard’s reading, their pure
experience thus belied the “social imaginary” of the “secularization thesis.” Chapters four and five
provide brilliant syntheses of Schaff and Maritain, their views on American religion in relation to
their broader intellectual trajectories, and their vocal defenses of American religion and culture at
home and abroad.
Howard’s concluding concern is to broaden myopic analyses of contemporary Trans-Atlantic
divergences. Current policy differences do not explain themselves. Rather, long-standing elite
discourse on American religion has “left a sizable mark on the formative presuppositions” of
Europeans in the modern era (p.200). Howard’s impressive command of such a large sweep of
intellectual history convincingly demonstrates that history’s continuing and pervasive presence in
contemporary dialogue.
But make no mistake; this is an intellectual history of elite discourse, which begs at least two
further inquiries beyond the scope of Howard’s volume. First, to what extent were elite portrayals of
American religion reactions to popular European philo-Americanism? Tantalizing glimpses of popular
perspectives often surface in Howard’s narrative, as when Tory intellectuals offered the effects of
American voluntarism as evidence of

the unreasonableness of

dissenters’ demands for

disestablishment in England, or when later figures like Rilke decried the increasing Americanization of
European culture. What would a narrative of European perceptions of American religion look like if
voice were given to the masses? Second, how might the elite discourse narrated here illuminate the
making of religion itself ? Out of functional necessity, Howard adopts an admittedly problematic and
fluid definition of religion as, at times, “efforts to relate to the divine,” and, more often, “evangelical
Protestantism” (pp.9-10). But Religious Studies scholars with their own set of inquiries might find
useful vistas here for exploring the layers of discourse that have defined, rather than merely
denigrated, religion in the modern West.
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Howard’s work is vastly informative, persuasively argued, carefully organized, beautifully
written, and increasingly relevant. It is intellectual history at its best and opens up as many pressing
and perceptive questions as it helps to answer.
BRADLEY KIME
Utah State University
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Faxneld, Per, and Jesper A. Petersen, eds. The Devil’s Party: Satanism in Modernity. New York: Oxford
University Press, USA, 2013. 289 pp. ISBN 9780190779246.
In The Devil’s Party, Per Faxneld and Jesper Petersen compile essays from twelve of the top
scholars in the field of Satanism. The goal of the book is not to exhaustively cover the topic, nor is it
to persuade the reading audience that Satanism is good or evil. Rather Faxneld and Petersen choose to
present an unbiased, academic overview of Satanism as a religion, and in that manner they are entirely
successful.
The fact is that the word Satanism is, itself, enough to invoke a range of emotions in the
average person. Some people are strangely drawn to the idea, while others are blatantly repelled by it.
These feelings are the result of an intricate combination of one’s theology, worldview, education, and
many other factors. Faxneld and Petersen suggest that these emotions “need to be put to the side.
Satanism, like all other religions, can and should be studied in a detached manner” (p.3).
The first point on the authors’ agenda is to distinguish between Satanism as a “social and
cultural phenomenon” and a “religious and philosophical one” (p.4). In many ways, Satanism in popular
culture is an entirely different entity than that of the religion adhered to by many today and
throughout history. Faxneld and Petersen make clear that their intentions are to present an overview
of Satanism as religion, while filtering out the perceptions that popular culture has imbedded in the
minds of many.
Following a brief overview and outline, the book is separated into four distinct sections, each
containing three essays by different scholars. Faxneld and Petersen chose to take a very
methodological approach in compiling the book, as these sections are arranged in both a chronological
and thematic fashion (p.4), which helps the book to flow smoothly. Together these sections present a
very impressive and holistic overview of the religion of Satanism, but each could stand on its own as a
thoroughly interesting read as well.
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The first section, titled “The Question of History: Precursors and Currents,” covers the earliest
roots of recorded Satanism. Tracing such a belief system, which to this day does not have a consensus
definition, is a difficult task. As Faxneld admits, “who is and is not a Satanist is of course a matter of
definition and time specific conceptualizations of terms” (p.19). Nevertheless, these essays trace the
religion back to early Swedish literature and history, and then discuss its evolution in the nineteenth
century, which Faxneld sees as “a turning point in the history of modern religious Satanism” (11).
Finally, Faxneld’s own contribution to the book introduces Polish author Stanislaw Przybyszewski,
whom Faxneld claims to be a pioneer of modern Satanism, in that he “formulated what is likely the
first attempt ever to construct a more or less systematic Satanism” (74).
The second section, “The Black Pope and the Church of Satan,” presents a trio of essays
covering Anton LaVey, who founded the Church of Satan in the 1960s and is by far “the most iconic
figure in the satanic milieu” today (p.79). These essays allow the reader a glimpse into the mind of a
very unique man by attempting to address the various ideologies he developed. In the first chapter,
Amina O. Lap offers an analysis of LaVey’s early writings. Eugene Gallaher then takes a closer look at
the most notable of those works, The Satanic Bible, easily “the most popular and recognized book on
Satanism today” (p.12). Gallagher offers some interesting and surprising insight into LaVey’s
masterpiece. Finally, Asbjorn Dyrendal takes a look at some of LaVey’s later writings from the 1990s,
examining the role that conspiracy theories played in his ideology.
The book then moves on to “The Legacy of Dr. LaVey: The Satanic Milieu Today.” The
particular focus of this section is how the practice of Satanism in today’s contemporary society differs
from the Satanism of the past. The prevalent factor in the development of modern Satanism is the
invention of the Internet and the continual advance in technology (p.141). These developments have
added a whole new dimension to the study of this faith, which is now more readily available and less
mysterious to people everywhere.
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Finally, the book closes with a section entitled “Post-Satanism, Left-Handed Paths, and Beyond:
Visiting the Margins.” The focus here is on discussing groups that “display a fairly prominent use of
satanic symbolism” but “do not self-designate as Satanists” (p.205). Kennet Granholm proposes the
terms “left-hand path” (p.212) and “Post-Satanism” (p.214) to designate such groups.
Ultimately, Faxneld and Petersen have done an admirable job of collecting centuries of
information on the topic of Satanism and presenting it in an organized manner. However, a conclusion
from the editors would have been beneficial in summarizing the combined value of the four sections,
but overall this book is an important and innovative work in that it is one of the first to really
approach the study of Satanism from a purely academic and unbiased perspective.
CHRIS VERBRACKEN
Bethel Seminary
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Bilici, Mucahit. Finding Mecca in America: How Islam is Becoming an American Religion. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2012. 257 pp. ISBN 9780226049571.
In his inaugural book, Mucahit Bilici, assistant professor of sociology at John Jay College, City
University of New York, strives to answer this question: “How is the…nearness of the perceived
intruder transformed into the…familiarity of a fellow inhabitant?” (p.10). Utilizing his specialties in
cultural sociology and social theory, Bilici analyzes the transformation of Islam and Muslims from
foreigners to countrymen in the American cultural landscape. His approach scrutinizes, personalizes,
and humorizes this transition through vehicles both theoretical and practical, exploring everything
from civilian rights to comedy as he tells the story of the “cultural settlement of Islam” (p.63).
Bilici’s argument revolves around the transition through the eyes of Muslims (p.63). The first
half of his book, labeled “Cultural Settlement,” deals with “the orientations, translations, and cultural
fine-tuning that take place at the interface of Muslim life and American forms” (p.30). Here, Bilici
highlights the logistical changes necessitated by Islam’s spread to America. He first argues that
disparate Muslim communities continuously aim for unification, a goal embodied in the reorientation
of qibla lines in American mosques, in accordance with technical, rather than “organic” conceptions of
space (p.61). He then details the adaptation of English as a Muslim language, as Islam adopted English
translations of Arabic words and English accommodated the new Arabic terminology. Finally, Bilici
shows America’s transformation from a “land of chaos” to a “land of Islam” as immigrant Muslims
adopted America as a permanent homeland, not just a land for a temporary missionizing effort. This
organization allows Bilici to show a process of cultural adaptation: unification of the foreign group,
mutual change on the part of both cultures, and final acceptance of a new homeland.
Bilici builds on this framework to develop the second part of his book, which covers individual
citizenship and the growth of Muslim immigrants into their new civil and popular identities. He
discusses Muslims’ new roles as bearers of American rights, members of interfaith communities, and
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creators of a new manifestation of ethnic comedy. In these chapters, Bilici makes Muslim assimilation
more personal and changes its definition from loss of cultural identity to loss of “stranger” status
(p.190). He argues that new generations of American-born Muslims are assisting in a shift toward
unity of both cultures as Muslims become more “American.”
Throughout this book, Bilici explores the tensions of cultural acceptance. He probes the battle
between a distinct Muslim identity and followers’ eagerness to alter their separatist image amongst
21st century Americans. He shows a strain between generations and nationalities, some of which favor
exclusion, and others which seek inclusion. He illuminates the difficulty of creating a new homeland
for a religion which is intrinsically tied by culture and practice to its geographic origins. Thus, Bilici
frames the difficulty of assimilation not in getting “in” with American society, but rather in Muslim
communities’ and individuals’ struggles to overcome their conflicting goals and desires. This depth of
insight not only brings such turmoils to light, but works through them conceptually, elucidating
concepts and doctrines which deftly bridge the gaps between various groups.
Bilici’s strengths lie in sociological analysis. He frequently cites social theory giants, like Georg
Simmel and Martin Heidigger, and turns to thorough discussions of concepts such as language and
home. Though the vocabulary is heavy for the unitiated, his analysis strengthens his arguments on
how a new Muslim identity develops. He is creative in his use of evidence, which is particularly
apparent in the chapter on ethnic comedy which provides a much-appreciated lightness but also a
fascinating insight into American-Muslim popular culture. Bilici is adept at handling these unique
perspectives, revolving the entire ethnography around the shift in culture through the eyes of
Muslims, which alone sets this book apart from other scholarship. However, Bilici struggles to define
what “American” identity truly is while still painting the nation as a connected whole from which
others are excluded. Additionally, he occasionally fails to extend the discussion beyond immigrant
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perspectives by including an ever-growing population of American-born Muslims. Regardless of these
small oversights, his argument and approach remain strong.
Finding Mecca in America provides a relevant look at cultural change and immigrant nations.
The principles which Bilici lays out in this book, from the steps of broad cultural acceptance to
individual assumption of new roles and identities, extend beyond the borders of Islam to all those
labeled “other” in an American mindset. He guides them toward realization of home as a way of
orienting the self to grow into a place or culture. Bilici states that “s human being’s nature [home] is
his culture, which he creates as he moves along,” and demonstrates that through such creation, one can
find home in a new and extended self (p.216). By so doing, Bilici earns an important place in the
discussion of American Islam, social theory, and personal identity.
KELSEY SAMUELSON
Brigham Young University

IMW Journal of Religious Studies Vol. 5:1

103

Stowe, David W. No Sympathy for the Devil: Christian Pop Music and the Transformation of American
Evangelicalism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011. 304 pp. ISBN 9780807834589.
No Sympathy for the Devil is a fine book on a crucial juncture in the history of religion and
music, worth studying for anyone interested in either subject.
Stowe’s thesis is that Christian rock originated when the countercultural strains of the 1960s
were combined, by a few committed evangelicals, with apocalypse-focused, biblically literal Christian
doctrine that claimed the reality of spiritual gifts, such as tongues and prophecy, and viewed the world
as a battleground between God and Satan. Thus, the sound and the feeling of the hippy movement,
complete with communal living experiments and giant music festivals, fostered a new brand of
evangelicalism that resonated with many young Christians, helping make evangelical Christianity a
major social and political force through the 70s and 80s.
Stowe presents his case primarily in the form of anecdotes from the lives of musicians,
preachers, organizers, politicians, new converts, and lapsed Christians, showing their spiritual
experiences, attempts to define their faith and art, struggles against temptation, and the role that new
Christian music played in it all. His descriptions bring the Jesus Movement to life. He also ably (and at
times dizzyingly) analyzes the songs, from rhythms to lyrics, and the movies and musicals that brought
Jesus onto center stage.
To provide context for the rise Christian rock, Stowe addresses not only evangelical
performers, but also fellow travelers including Billy Preston and Aretha Franklin, who, while never
part of the Christian rock scene, were deeply influenced by their religious upbringings. He also draws
in counterpoints, from Santana to Cat Stevens and Marvin Gaye, reminding readers that there were
many spiritual options for musicians outside of Christianity.
Unfortunately, Stowe’s focus on personal experiences, while providing a human perspective of
the motivations of those making Jesus music, provides little detail about how a mass of listeners
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across the nation responded to the music, or how it came to be assimilated into evangelical churches
across the country despite opposition from those evangelicals who viewed all rock as “worldly.” This
leaves a hole in Stowe’s argument about the cultural impact of Christian rock. He tells us much about
those who lived in the movement, went to Explo ‘72 or Godstock, or made the music that was played
there. This gives us insight into how rockers were born again, but little about regular listeners who
stayed at home and listened to the records while attending regular suburban churches with none of the
“hipness” or “showiness” of the California hippy or show-business churches Stowe describes.
The book’s other main weakness is that it is a story all about sound—and the sound of the
music, vital to understanding its impact, is poorly expressed on the printed page, even with Stowe’s
skilled descriptions. As I read, I found myself repeatedly wishing that the book came with an
accompanying CD with a representative selection of key tracks, or at least an appendix with chapter
by chapter listing of all referenced songs. Difficult as that may be given the nebulous and difficult
nature of copyright and distribution management in modern America, it would certainly have added a
great deal of force to Stowe’s otherwise compelling arguments.
MATTATHIAS WESTWOOD
Brigham Young University
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Moreland, J. P., Chad Meister, and Khaldoun A. Sweis, eds. Debating Christian Theism. New York,
Oxford University Press, 2013. 574 pp. ISBN 9780199755448
In Debating Christian Theism, editors J.P. Moreland, Chad Meister and Khaldoun A. Sweis have
put together a work that is both relevant to our times and intellectually compelling. The anthology
contains two major sections. The first is composed of philosophical debates about the plausibility of
theism in general, such as the fine-tuning argument, the problem of evil, and issues with omniscience.
The second deals with specifically Christian issues, such as the Incarnation, the Resurrection, and the
Trinity. Both of these major sections are subdivided in order to present two opposing views on topical
controversial issues, which are usually authored by an atheistic/agnostic philosopher on the one side
and a theistic philosopher on the other.
In the first section of the work, titled “Debates About God’s Existence,” introduces the
philosophical issues regarding the possibility of the existence of the classically defined God. While
some of these debates, such as the discussion of omniscience, may require some prior metaphysical
training, they are for the most part fairly accessible, getting straight to the point and only using the
most cogent examples. Some of the essays in this section give new perspectives on old arguments, such
as William Lane Craig’s “The Kalam Argument,” which concisely lays out one of the oldest arguments
for God, arguing that the universe cannot have existed infinitely in the past and must have had a
beginning. In addition to familiar arguments, there are also some fairly original ideas presented in the
first section, such as Kevin Corcoran’s “Humans are Material Persons Only.” In it, Corcoran goes
against mainstream Christian philosophy by embracing materialism over mind body dualism. While
this position might be rare amongst Christian philosophers, Corcoran makes a strong case for the
Christian materialist.
Joseph Bulbulia’s essay in the first section of the book, titled “Bayes and the Evolution of
Religious Belief,” stands out as a particularly intriguing argument. In it, he asserts that, when
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applicable, Baye’s rule of statistical probability should be applied to the debate on the existence of
God. If we can assign rough probabilities to the hypothesis that God does or does not exist, then we
can adjust this belief accordingly when presented with evidence that either supports or undermines
this position. Bulbulia uses the evidence that our belief in a god or gods would exist even if God did
not exist because of evolutionary pressures. If the theist uses the conviction of God as evidence for
his hypothesis, his belief should be adjusted accordingly. Bulbulia does not assert that his argument
completely undermines the possibility of a God, merely that it should influence how a decision maker
might adjust his views in light of the evidence. This method provides a good framework for discussing
the multitude of issues in the debate over the existence of God.
The second section of Debating Christian Theism, titled “Debates About Specific Christian
Beliefs,” delves into arguments concerning the plausibility of some essential concepts of Christianity
and the historicity of certain biblical events. Just as in the first section, the last group of essays
contains both new looks at classical arguments and some more recent developments in the debate on
Christianity. Katherin A. Rodgers, for example, develops an interesting argument for the Incarnation
based on Anselm’s work concerning the subject, in which she likens the Incarnation to a person
playing a video game. Paul F. Knitter, on the other hand, develops a relatively new position in the
debate over religion that Christianity is but one of many correct paths in life in his chapter called
“There Are Many Ways to God.” While these chapters may come from a wide historical range, they
are woven together to address the multitude of issues surrounding Christian theism.
Although the text is overall well done, some small issues exist. Depth is often sacrificed for
brevity, but this does not take away from the work as a whole as these essays are more of an
introduction to the debates than an exhaustive treatment of them, and the authors still manage to
make their arguments effectively. The issue of free will, which seems to be an important topic
regarding the existence of God, is absent from the work, save for a brief mention in Julian Baggini’s
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“Science is at Odds with Christianity” (p.315). Finally, in some of the last few debates regarding
specifically Christian issues, such as the historicity of the resurrection, both sides are represented by
writers from a Christian perspective. Even though there is a benefit to this author choice, in that it
shows the reader that Christians may have conflicting ideas on very crucial topics, it seems as though
the perspective of a historically skeptical atheist/agnostic would strengthen the debate.
Despite these minor issues, Debating Christian Theism remains a comprehensive body of work.
Unlike many other works that deal with the philosophical issues of religion, it covers an enormous
range of topics and presents the views of both theists and non-theists alike. Moreover, the range is
enhanced by the use of both classic and modern viewpoints, which captures the breadth of the debate
throughout history. Even though debates on these issues can often become heated, the authors remain
respectful to their opponents and the editors have compiled their work in a fair manner. The short, yet
informative, articles will give new students a strong entry into the broad range of current scholarship
on religious issues and seasoned scholars will find some new insights in some very old debates.
MICHAEL COHEN
University of Delaware
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Gschwandtner, Christina. Postmodern Apologetics? Arguments for God in Contemporary Philosophy. New
York: Fordham University Press, 2013. 352 pp. ISBN 9780823242740
Post-Modern or Continental Philosophy often has the reputation of being esoteric and
impenetrable. Many prominent thinkers within the movement at times employ dense, difficult prose
that scares away many readers. Christina Gschwandtner’s Postmodern Apologetics? Arguments for God in
Contemporary Philosophy attempts to provide an introduction to religious thought and/or apologetics
within Continental Philosophy that covers many important Post-Modern philosophers in an accessible
manner.
The book starts by examining religious elements in the works of Martin Heidegger,
Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida. While she concedes that these philosophers are not
apologetic in nature (and are often hostile to traditional theology), Gschwandtner covers how these
thinkers employ religious imagery and themes at various points in their work. She explains how
Husserl and Heidegger introduced the phenomenological approach to philosophy, which called for a
return to basic perceptions and appearances, and hermeneutics, which advocated moving from a basic
starting point to understand the world. Heidegger also moved away from what he called “ontotheology” (traditional metaphysics and proofs for the existence of God), which he felt reduced God to
a conceptual supreme being. She next covers how Levinas examined the infinite and irreducible nature
of individuals who demand total service and obedience with their unfathomable appearance.
Gschwandtner shows how Derrida explores the implications of this phenomenology of the Other
(“the face of the Other”) for the possibility of gift-giving, hospitality, and religious experience,
particularly through the lens of Abraham and Isaac. Indeed, she notes that Derrida seems to think that
the infinite and thus unquenchable call of the Other drains traditional religion and theology of all
meaning because they try to put limits on someone (God) who is not limited.

IMW Journal of Religious Studies Vol. 5:1

109

In the second part of her book, Gschwandtner explores how the French philosophers Paul
Ricoeur, Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, Jean-Louis Chretien, Jean-Yves Lacoste, and Emmanuel
Falque have used elements from Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida to study religion and the divine.
While many of these thinkers do not make traditional arguments for the existence of God, she asserts
that they all in one form or another deal with questions of transcendence and meaning with the help
of phenomenology (particularly in regards to the Other), hermeneutics, or both. Furthermore, she
notes that the relationship often goes the other way, in that these philosophers employ religious texts
or themes (particularly Christian and Catholic) to inform their phenomenological and/or
hermeneutical studies. Indeed, according to her account, these thinkers find themselves in and operate
out of a particular tradition. Instead of offering logical proofs or scientific evidence for the existence
of God, she argues that they legitimize religious belief and experience by demonstrating a sort of
internal cohesion and depth within certain religious traditions (which she believes is in line with early
patristic apologetics).
The final portion of Gschwandtner’s book covers three English-speaking thinkers (Merold
Westphal, John Caputo, and Richard Kearney) that have co-opted elements of the French continental
tradition in various ways. She reads Caputo as a disciple of Derrida who has done much to introduce
him to the English-speaking world, while Westphal and Kearney attempt to incorporate many of the
insights from Continental Philosophy without completely undermining all traditional religious or
Christian beliefs.
Gschwandtner’s study covers an impressive variety of thinkers and manages to explain the
religious elements (or at least the religious implications) of their work in a clear and concise manner.
Her chapter on Levinas is especially good in this regard. Levinas’ phenomenology of the Other is
critical for later Continental Philosophy, but his prose is often difficult. Gschwandtner manages to
provide a lucid description of this challenging philosophical concept. While secondary sources cannot
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replace primary ones, this book would be ideal as an introduction or accompaniment for
undergraduates hoping to study certain religious strains within Continental Philosophy. Furthermore,
because each chapter focuses on a particular philosopher, students could read sections independent of
the rest of the book if they wanted to study one or more of the thinkers Gschwandter examines.
MICHAEL OTTESON
Kansas University

